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LAST BASTION OF SCHOOL SPONSORED PRAYER?
INVOCATIONS AT PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD MEETINGS:
THE CONFLICTINGJURISPRUDENCE OF MARSH V. CHAMBERS
AND THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES
BRUCE P. MERENSTEINt
And when you pray, be not like the hypocrites, for they love to pray in
the synagogues and on the important street comers to be seen by the
people.... [W]hen you pray, enter your inner room and with the door
closed pray to your Father, the Invisible, and your Father who sees in se-
cret will reward you.
[T]he April 8 [school board] meeting opened with the following: "Oh
God, dear God, Lord,Jesus Christ, God bless us all, merciful Father."2
INTRODUCTION
One newspaper labeled the practice of opening local government
meetings with prayer as "curious."' This Comment will not look at how
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and for practical assistance without which this Comment never would have seen the
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I Matthew 6:5-:6 (quoting Jesus). For a similar sentiment from a contemporary
author, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, PIETY ALONG THE POTOMAc: NOTES ON POLITICS
AND MORALS IN THE FIFTIES 46 (1964) ("All religious affirmations are in danger of
standing in contradiction to the life that is lived under them, but none more so than
these general, inoffensive, and externalized ones which are put together for public
purposes.").
Ted Wendling, 2 Board Members Sue over Prayers, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May
22, 1996, at 4B.
s Susan Shelly, Prayer at Board Meetings Not Offensive, Just Curious, READING TIMES,
July 29, 1987, at 37.
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"curious" this practice may be, but at whether it is constitutional.4
Prayer at public school board meetings, even more so than graduation
prayer,5 is at the intersection of two distinct and conflicting lines of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence: the "religion and public schools" arena
and the legislative prayer realm.6
For almost a half-century, the Supreme Court consistently has held
that school-sponsored religious activity, whether sectarian instruction,
group prayers or Bible reading, violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.7 While there is a common perception that thisjuris-
4 This question has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court or a federal court of
appeals. On December 17, 1996, a federal districtjudge in Ohio rejected the recom-
mendation of a magistrate judge that the Cleveland School Board's practice of begin-
ning its meetings with prayer be found unconstitutional. See Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 950 F. Supp. 1337, 1347 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding school board prayer consti-
tutional based on the Supreme Court's holding in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), that state legislative prayer is constitutional). For the district court's overview
of the magistrate's analysis and recommendation, see id. at 1340-41 (noting that the
magistrate found that the school board prayer failed the Lemon, coercion and en-
dorsement tests and that she found the Marsh analysis inappropriate in that context).
The plaintiffs in Coles are preparing an appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Telephone Interview with Joshua R. Cohen, Plaintiff's Counsel, Coles v. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. (Feb. 21, 1997).
No scholarly work has yet analyzed the constitutionality of school board prayer,
although attorneys affiliated with the National School Boards Association have con-
cluded that school board prayer is constitutional. See Spencer E. Covert & Mary E.
Binning, Invocations at School Board Meetings: Still Constitutional After All These Years, in
RELIGION, EDUCATION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 76 (National Sch. Bds. Ass'n
ed., 1994); cf. Margaret L. Usdansky, Prayer Ban Lesson for All Schools, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 31, 1989, at Al (reporting that, according to ProfessorJohn Witte Jr., the
legislative prayer case of Marsh v. Chambers "has generally been interpreted to allow
prayer before city council meetings .... [b]ut the case did not address school board
meetings").
Cf Gregory M. McAndrew, Note, Invocations at Graduation, 101 YALE LJ. 663, 663
(1991) ("The issue of invocations at public school graduations involves the intersec-
tion of two competing strands of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Graduation
prayer is a traditional, ceremonial practice that takes place in the special context of
the public schools." (footnote omitted)).
For a thorough discussion of the issue of public prayer, of which legislative
prayer is a major subset, see generally Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer,
Civil Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 79 IOWAL. REV. 35, 41-93 (1993).
The relevant portion of the First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The prohibi-
tion against government establishment of religion has been made applicable to state
and local governments through the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)
("The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth ... commands that a state 'shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of
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prudence has been based on the "impressionability" of young children,8
a close examination of the "religion and public schools" cases reveals
that, in fact, most of the Court's key cases in this area fail to discuss the
issue of "impressionability" at all; the few that do address the issue note
simply that the public school context provides a "special" concern, but
is not a necessary component of an Establishment Clause violation.9
On the other hand, the only time the Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to officially sponsored prayer by a government body other than a
public school, in Marsh v. Chambers,'o it approved the practice. In
Marsh, the Court held that Nebraska's "practice of opening [legislative]
sessions with prayers by a state-employed clergyman" did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." In so holding, the
Court relied primarily on two related justifications. The first justifica-
tion, which I will refer to as "historical patterns," is that opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer is a longstanding, widely accepted practice that
"has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious
freedom" for more than two centuries. '2  The second justification,
which I will refer to as the "contemporaneous practices" argument, is
that the drafters of the Establishment Clause supposedly expressed
their support for state legislative prayer by voting to employ a legislative
the states as incompetent as Congress to enact... laws [respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof]."). The case in which the Court be-
gan this consistent line of "religion and public schools" holdings was Illinois ex reL
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), discussed in detail infra Part I.A.1.
8 See, e.g., Coles, 950 F. Supp. at 1343, 1345-46 (asserting that the Supreme Court
has applied stricter scrutiny to Establishment Clause claims in the school setting "due
to the impressionability of youth and the compulsory nature of school attendance");
Usdansky, supra note 4, at Al ("The courts have generally held that because of their
youth, elementary and secondary school pupils are impressionable and should be pro-
tected from institutions like prayer that may be widely accepted by society .... ."); see
also Theresa M. Serra, Note, Invocations and Benedictions-Is the Supreme Court
"Graduating" to a Marsh Analysis?, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 769, 785 n.139 (1988) ("The im-
maturity of young school children and their susceptibility to influence and peer pres-
sure has been a critical factor in several of the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating
attempts by the government to introduce religion into the public schools."). Serra
provides scant support for her assertion, citing only one Supreme Court majority opin-
ion addressing religion in the public schools. See id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
9 See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 n.51 (1985) (alluding to the fact that
government endorsement of religion "has special force in the public-school context").
For a full discussion of this issue, see infra Part IA
10 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
1 Id. at 786.
12 Id. (noting the presence of legislative prayer "[f]rom colonial times through the
founding of the Republic and ever since").
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chaplain for the first Congress.'3 Because the Court found it untenable
that members of the first Congress "intended the Establishment Clause
of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable," it
held that the practice was constitutional.1
4
These conflicting spheres of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
overlap regularly at the public school board meeting. Should officially
sponsored prayers at these meetings be governed by the Court's unwav-
ering opposition to religious activity in the public school context? Or
are such prayers simply an extension of the "legislative prayer" which
the Court approved in Marsh v. Chambers? With a challenge to school
board prayer currently being litigated in federal court in Ohio, 5 it may
not be long before the Supreme Court is called upon to resolve this di-
lemma.
6
Is See id. at 788. The United States Congress continues to employ legislative chap-
lains. See 2 U.S.C. § 84-2 (1994) (establishing compensation for House chaplain); id.
§ 61d (1994) (establishing compensation for Senate chaplain); see also Pete Yost, On
Capitol Hill Many Aides Get High Pay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 1996, at A7 (noting that
the Senate chaplain receives a $116,000 salary, while the House chaplain receives
$123,000 per year).
The Supreme Court has never entertained a challenge to legislative chaplaincies at
the federal level. Cf Murray v. Buchanan, 720 F.2d 689, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (per curiam) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers is dispositive
of appellants' challenge to the public funding of congressional chaplains."); see also
Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting, for lack of standing, a
challenge to congressional chaplains' refusal to permit plaintiff to offer nontheist in-
vocations), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). In the Kurtz case, then-Circuit Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from the panel's holding that the plaintiff lacked
standing. SeeKurtz, 829 F.2d at 1145 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
'4 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91.
15 See supra note 4.
16 It is difficult to determine exactly how prevalent is the practice of prayer at local
government meetings, including school board meetings. There are but a few law re-
view articles or books that refer to the practice explicitly. See, e.g., RODNEY K. SMITH,
PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION 237 (1987) (noting that "[p]ublic prayers are offered frequently at the
commencement of public meetings at the city and county levels"); Arlin M. Adams &
CharlesJ. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1656 (1989)
(noting that city "boards and councils often open sessions with invocations").
More common is reference to prayers in newspaper articles. See, e.g., Jeff Nelson,
Moment of Silence to Replace Prayer, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 16, 1992, at 1W7 (reporting
that only one of twelve school boards in the region began their meetings with prayer);
Kelley Root, Area Boards, Councils Pray for Guidance, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 24, 1996,
at Al (reporting that one half of school boards in one county open meetings with
prayer but only 10% do so in a neighboring county). These reports and others seem
to indicate that the practice, though not widespread, is far from uncommon. In most
cases where the practice does exist, it appears to be of fairly recent vintage. See, e.g., Jo
Cart, School Board Opens Meeting with Prayer, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOC., Feb. 5,
1985, at 4B (reporting "the first opening prayer offered by the board in [the] memory
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This Comment argues that officially sponsored prayers at public
school board meetings are unconstitutional. I base this conclusion on a
three-part analysis of the issue. Part I will focus on the public school
context. First, I will examine the "religion and public schools" cases
from the last half-century, demonstrating that any notion that the
Court's decisions in this area rest on the impressionability of children
cannot withstand scrutiny. Additionally, looking at the purpose and
history of the public school and the public school board, I will show
that neither the Marsh reasoning nor its holding is applicable to school
board prayers.
Part II analyzes the Court's holding in Marsh, questioning whether
its exclusive reliance on historical arguments is a useful method of con-
stitutional analysis in the Establishment Clause context, particularly
when applied to the setting of public school board meetings. Finally,
Part III examines the issue of school board prayer through the Court's
primary Establishment Clause tests. Using both reports of school board
invocations in practice and the facts of other legislative prayer cases
from state and lower federal courts, I will demonstrate the likely pur-
pose and effect of school board prayer, providing the foundation for
measuring this conduct against the Court's major Establishment Clause
tests. I will conclude this final Part by briefly examining two other pro-
of reporters who have attended meetings for 20 years and more"); Dion Lefler, Prayer
at Meetings of School Board Urged, L.A. DAILY NEWs, May 29, 1992, at SV1 (noting the
proposal to begin opening board meetings with prayer); Dale Moss, A Matter of Principle:
School Board May Find Prayer Issue a Hot One, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Oct. 24, 1990, at
1B (reporting that one school board president eliminated invocations that had been
introduced in 1977); Evelyn Theiss, ACLU Opposes School Board Prayers, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 20, 1992, available in 1992 WL 4285802 (noting the introduction of
prayer in January 1992).
Finally, the manner in which prayers are offered seems to vary. See, e.g., Kari
Bland, Few Question School Board Using Prayer, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 15, 1992, at 61
(noting one district's practice of having district employees and community members
give invocations); Manuel Roig-Franzia, Curb on School Prayer Planned, NEW ORLEANS
TIM'hES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 15, 1995, at Al (noting one district's practice of having students
lead meeting prayers); Root, supra (reporting that some districts invite ministers to
give opening prayers, while others have board members lead the prayers themselves);
Wendling, supra note 2 (reporting that prayers are offered by local ministers).
17 It is worth noting that, prior to 1992, some courts extended the holding in
Marsh to permit prayer at public school graduations. See, e.g., Stein v. Plainwell Com-
munity Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987) ("The annual graduation exercises
here are analogous to the legislative and judicial sessions referred to in Marsh and
should be governed by the same principles."). This argument is one that the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected in Lee v. Weisman, discussed infra Part IA3. See Lee v. Weis-
man, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (distinguishing Marsh). See generally Serra, supra note 8
(discussing the application of a Marsh-type analysis to the graduation prayer setting).
1997] 1039
1040 UNIVERSTY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 145:1035
posals for reconciling government-sponsored prayer with the Estab-
lishment Clause, arguing that neither provides adequate justification
for ignoring the Supreme Court's longstanding mandate that "each
separate government in this country should stay out of the business of
writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious
function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to
look to for religious guidance. "..
I. SCHOOL BOARD PRAYER: SETTING THE STAGE
The fact that the sole Supreme Court legislative prayer case, Marsh
v. Chambers, relied exclusively on history-based arguments,' 9 coupled
with the short history of the modem public school,2° would seem reason
enough not to apply the Marsh holding to any issue arising in the con-
text of public schools. However, by ignoring its underlying rationale
and interpreting its holding in a broad manner, it might be argued that
the Court in Marsh sanctioned all forms of "legislative prayer," no mat-
ter how historically and functionally distinct the particular legislative
body might be from the Nebraska legislature or the Congress. There-
fore, in addition to noting the problems encountered when applying
Marsh's questionable reasoning to the public school setting,2' it is im-
portant to review the Court's key "religion and the schools" decisions,
in order to lay a foundation for analyzing the constitutionality of prayer
at public school board meetings.
It might be argued that the Court's public school decisions are in-
applicable to the present issue because the Court was concerned with
the coercion of impressionable children who are not present at school
board meetings. This argument suffers from at least two flaws. First, in
many cases, students do attend school board meetings.22 In fact, in
some districts where prayer takes place at board meetings, student rep-
resentatives sit on the school board itself.Y For the purposes of this
18 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (holding that state officials may not
create a state prayer and require schoolchildren to recite it).
19 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.3.
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 See, e.g., NATIONAL SCH. PUB. RELATIONS ASS'N, THE SCHOOL BOARD MEETING:
FACING NEW CHALENGES FROM THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA 27 (1970) (noting that
almost half of the districts in a survey reported some student attendance at school
board meetings, usually as part of a student assignment); see also Nelson, supra note 16
(reporting that one school board member noted that many school board meetings
have students in attendance).
See, e.g., Ernesto Portillo Jr., Prayer at Board Meetings on Way Out, SAN DIEGO
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Comment, however, I will assume, contrary to this evidence, that only
adults attend school board meetings.
The more fundamental problem with this argument is that it mis-
reads the Court's school and religion cases. Although some members
of the Court have recently advocated a coercion-based test for Estab-
lishment Clause violations,.2 4 a finding of coercion has been explicitly
rejected as a necessary condition for an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.25 As discussed below, the Court's decisions striking down religious
intrusion into public schools have declined to rely exclusively or even
primarily on the fact that pupils are young, presumably impressionable,
and compelled to attend public schools. Rather, in each of these cases,
the Court has focused on the fact that the public school is a govern-
mental institution and one that is particularly important to the mainte-
nance of a democratic, pluralistic society.
A. Religion and Public Schools: From McCollum to Lee
1. The Early Years
For the past fifty years, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been somewhat of a mixed bag. Some religious dis-
plays pass constitutional muster; others do not. Some funding of re-
ligious institutions is met with approval;21 some funding is found un-
constitutional. 2  However, in the area of public schools, despite
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 24, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7473764.
24 See infra Part III.C.
See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying'text.
26 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (approving dis-
play of Chanukah menorah on government property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (approving government display of creche).
27 See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-02 (holding that display of creche on govern-
ment property violates the Establishment Clause, but distinguishing the holding from
the decision in Lynch).
28 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993)
(approving state funding of sign language interpreter for deaf student attending relig-
ious school); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (approving participation of
religious organizations in government-funded adolescent sex education program);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (funding for religious school textbooks,
testing and diagnostic services is constitutional).
See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255 (funding for instructional materials and
equipment and field trips is not constitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625
(1971) (striking down state aid to religious schools in the form of either direct or indi-
rect payment of a portion of teacher salaries).
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criticism from within the Court itself,3 from the other two branches of
government, s' and from much of the public,32 the Court has been re-
markably consistent, striking down any state-sponsored religious ex-
pression or involvement in the public schools.33
The Court first faced the issue of religion and the public schools in
two cases decided almost a halft-century ago, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educationm and Zorach v. Clauson.35 In McCollum, an eight Jus-
tice majority (with only Justice Reed dissenting) held that a state pro-
gram that gave sectarian religious groups access to public school class-
rooms for religious instruction violated the Establishment Clause. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Black emphasized "the use of tax-
supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation
between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting
religious education."6 In a broad conclusion that appeared to fore-
close any commingling between government and religious institutions,
the Court held that "[n] either a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
30 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas,J_.) (criticizing the Court's decision
striking down graduation prayer).
31 See, e.g., President William Clinton, Remarks at James Madison High School on
Religious Liberty in America (July 12, 1995) (noting his disagreement with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman). For criticism from the legislative branch,
see generally Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading
in the Public Schools: Hearings Before the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 88th Cong. (1964)
(debating constitutional amendments that would have allowed prayers in public
schools and other public places). Such congressional attempts to overturn Supreme
Court decisions addressing religion and the schools have continued unabated for
more than 30 years. See, e.g., Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings-Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: Hearings on S.450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980) (debating constitutional
amendment that would have the effect of eliminating federal court jurisdiction over
cases involving the constitutionality of state laws that regulate school prayer). For the
most recent attempts, see SJ. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a constitutional
amendment that would allow voluntary school prayer) or H.R.J. Res. 16, 104th Cong.
(1995) (same). See also 141 CONG. REc. S2151 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Helms) ("[I]n 1962, the Supreme Court forfeited by judicial fiat the rights of mil-
lions of American children to invoke in their schools the blessings and guidance of
God.").
32 Cf GEORGE H. GALLUPJR., RELIGION IN AMERICA 1996, at 75 (1996) (noting that
77% of persons polled in 1974, and 71% in 1995, supported a constitutional amend-
ment allowing prayer in the schools).
But cf. infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209.
PRAYER AT PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD MEETINGS
tions or groups, and vice versa."37 Although the Court has backed away
from such a blanket prohibition in recent years, 8 this statement has
been adhered to in the context of public schools in the decades since
McCollum.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in McCollum, joined by
three otherJustices, concentrated not only on the close relationship be-
tween government and religious institutions, but on the unique setting
of public schools and the importance of public education. He noted
the changing nature of public schools in the United States, from pre-
Constitution times through the framing of the Establishment Clause
and the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.3 He then stated a
principle that the Court has invoked repeatedly when faced with relig-
ious intrusion into public education:
The sharp confinement of the public schools to secular education was a
recognition of the need of a democratic society to educate its children,
insofar as the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from
pressures in a realm in which pressures are most resisted and where con-
flicts are most easily and most bitterly engendered. Designed to serve as
perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupu-
40lously free from entanglement in the strife of sects.
It is worth remembering these words when returning to the topic at
37 Id. at 210-11. The Court also rejected the argument that the Establishment
Clause forbade only "government preference of one religion over another, not an im-
partial governmental assistance of all religions." Id. at 211.
s8 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (approving participation of
religious organizations in a government-funded sex education program); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (permitting a Presbyterian minister to partici-
pate in opening prayers before the state legislature).
s9 See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213-20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As Justice Frank-
furter noted:
The evolution of colonial education, largely in the service of religion, into
the public school system of today is the story of changing conceptions regard-
ing the American democratic society, of the functions of State-maintained
education in such a society, and of the role therein of the free exercise of re-
ligion by the people. The modern public school derived from a philosophy of
freedom reflected in the First Amendment.
Id. at 214; see also infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
40 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
reiterated the point in concluding his opinion:
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most per-
vasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is
it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing,
not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.
Id. at 231.
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hand, invocations at public school board meetings. As Justice Frank-
furter recognized, it was not simply "the state's compulsory public
school machinery"4' that made religious instruction a concern. Rather,
it was the unique role of the public school as "perhaps the most power-
ful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people" that required the public school as an institution, not simply as a
location where students gathered, to "keep scrupulously free from en-
tanglement in the strife of sects."
42
Four years after McCollum,43 the Court addressed a challenge to a
New York City program similar to the program at issue in McCollum. In
Zorach v. Clauson," the program at issue allowed pupils the option of be-
ing released from secular classroom instruction to be taught religious
instruction by nonpublic school teachers.45 Unlike the program in
McCollum, however, the one in Zorach required participating students to
leave the public school premises during the school day and go to relig-
ious institutions for religious instruction or prayer services. As Justice
Douglas noted, in writing for a six-to-three majority upholding the pro-
gram, the "'released time' program involves neither religious instruc-
tion in public school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds."40
Although the issue in Zorach arguably could be characterized as one in-
volving government funding of religious institutions rather than relig-
ious involvement in public schools, 4 7 assuming it falls under the latter
heading, it represents a rare departure from the Court's strict prohibi-
tion against religious involvement in public schools.
Justice Douglas, however, recast the issue in terms of the impor-
tance of religious freedom.4s He saw no difference between the organ-
41 Id. at 212 (Black,J.).
42 Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43 In the four years following McCollum, the Court's decision striking down
"released time" programs within public schools created a great deal of controversy. See
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that "few
opinions from this Court in recent years have attracted more attention or stirred wider
debate" than McCollum).
44 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
45 Id. at 308.
46 Id. at 308-09.
47 As Justice Douglas noted in response to the contention that the public school
system was being used to coerce children into participating in religious instruction,
"the school authorities are neutral in this regard and do no more than release stu-
dents whose parents so request." Id. at 311.
48 In this vein, Justice Douglas produced arguably the most famous line in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence: "We are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313. It is interesting to note that, although this conclu-
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ized "released time" program and, for example, the request by ajewish
student to be excused from class on Yom Kippur.49 The three dissent-
ing Justices, in separate opinions, emphasized the compulsory atten-
dance feature of public schools as providing a benefit to the religious
institutions to whom the pupils were released.50
A decade would pass before the Court decided another major case
involving religion and the public schools. In two cases decided within a
year of each other, Engel v. Vitale1 and School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp,52 the Court struck down school sponsored prayers and Bible
reading in public schools.5 3 Some of the six different majority or con-
curring opinions in these cases mentioned the concern with combining
compulsory school attendance with either prayers or Bible reading.M
However, it is clear that the constitutional problem with prayer or Bible
reading in public schools did not arise from the coercive effect of com-
pulsory attendance or from concern Nith the malleability of young
minds-but rather from the concern with mixing religious activity and
sory dicta has been cited by commentators and Justices countless times since Zorach,
Justice Douglas himself later adopted a much broader approach to the Establishment
Clause, rejecting any notion that the Constitution permits nonpreferential aid to relig-
ion. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("If believers are entitled to public financial support, so are nonbeliev-
ers.... [O]ne of the mandates of the First Amendment is to promote a viable, plural-
istic society and to keep government neutral, not only between sects, but also between
believers and nonbelievers.").
49 See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
50 Again, this approach makes Zorach appear much more like a government aid to
religion case than a religious intrusion in public schools case. See, e.g., id. at 318
(Black, J., dissenting) ("The state thus makes religious sects beneficiaries of its power
to compel children to attend secular schools.... New York is manipulating its compul-
sory education laws to help religious sects get pupils."); id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (noting the religious institutions' "attempts to secure public school pupils for
sectarian instruction" through the "instrument" of compulsory public school atten-
dance); id. at 323-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the program is essentialy
government aid to religion in that the state uses its power to "compel each student to
yield a large part of his time for public secular education" and then releases some of
the time to him "on condition that he devote it to sectarian religious purposes").
51 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Justice Black delivered the opinion for the Court in Enge4
as he had in McCollum.
52 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Schempp was decided along with the companion case of
Murray v. Curlett, id.
3 In both cases, only Justice Stewart dissented. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Engel 370 U.S. at 444 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
The particular concern that the public schools consisted of a captive audience
of impressionable children was briefly mentioned in the concurring opinions of Jus-
tice Brennan and Justice Goldberg in Schempp. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 290-92 & n.69
(Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 307 (Goldberg,J., concurring).
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a government institution.
In Enge, a challenge to the group recitation of an official school
prayer, both Justice Black's majority opinion and Justice Douglas's con-
currence noted a broad concern with a "prayer... composed by gov-
ernmental officials as a part of a governmental program to further relig-
ious beliefs." s Further, they emphasized the fact that "the person
praying is a public official on the public payroll, performing a religious
exercise in a governmental institution."16 Justice Douglas noted that no
57evidence existed of coercion of students to participate in the prayers,57
but the Court held, "[t]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exer-
cise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion."58 Justice Clark, writing for the Court in Schempp, restated
this point in noting that "a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is
predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need
not be so attended."59
Most fundamentally, Engel was about separating an explicitly relig-
ious activity from all governmental institutions. 1 The fact that young
55 Enge4 370 U.S. at 425 (BlackJ.).
Id. at 441 (Douglas,J., concurring).
5 See id. at 438. Justice Douglas made the same point in his concurrence in
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 228 (Douglas,J., concurring) ("In these cases we have no coercive
religious exercise aimed at making the students conform."). Indeed, if coercion were
the touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation, see infra Part III.C, it is question-
able whether the practices at issue in Engelor Schempp would have been struck down.
58 Enge4 370 U.S. at 430 (Black, J.); see also id. (noting that "[n]either the fact that
the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the
part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Estab-
lishment Clause").
59 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
60 Notwithstanding later Court decisions allowing some government funding of
religious institutions and some government sponsorship of religious displays, as well as
Court dicta that phrases such as "In God We Trust" or "One Nation Under God" are
harmless, there can be little doubt that "prayer is a religious activity[,] ... a solemn
avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty." Enge4 370
U.S. at 424. See infra Part III.D.1 for further discussion of this issue.
61 As Justice Black put it: "It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that
each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing orsanc-
tioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves
and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance." Enge, 370 U.S. at
435 (emphasis added). In further attempting to deflect the anticipated criticism that
the decision in Engel was antireligious, Justice Black pointed out that the Establish-
ment Clause's "first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Id. at
431 (emphasis added).
Any concerns that the wall of separation erected by McCollum, Engel and Schempp
would lead to a decline in religious faith in the United States appear not to have mate-
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pupils' attendance at a public school was compulsory was of little im-
portance in declaring the government-sponsored prayers unconstitu-
tional. 62 In Schempp as well it was not that the students comprised a cap-
tive audience that concerned the eight Justices voting to strike down
Bible reading in school, but rather that "the State [was] conducting a
religious exercise" and "employ[ing] its facilities or funds in a way that
gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than it
would have by relying on its members alone."5
In these Establishment Clause decisions, from 1948 through 1963,
the constitutional problem was the involvement of government in an
explicitly religious exercise. To the extent that the public school set-
ting raised extra concern, it was due to the special nature of public
schools as "the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny," rA rather than to any coercive ef-
fect of conducting religious activities in a classroom full of children r"
This distinction, misunderstood (or purposely obscured) by those who
argue for confining the Supreme Court's ban on government prayer to
the classroom setting, must be acknowledged before one can undertake
a full analysis of the issue of prayer at public school board meetings.
2. The Middle Years
In the fifteen years following Schempp, the Court confronted the Es-
tablishment Clause most often in the context of government funding of
religious institutions. r As for religious activities in the public schools
rialized. See, e.g., GALLUP, supra note 32, at 5-6 (noting that "the U.S. is one of the
most religious nations of the entire industrialized world, in terms of the level of at-
tested religious beliefs and practices" and that the years since World War II "have been
the most churched half-century in the nation's history").
62 The Court noted that the prayer's "observance on the part of the students is
voluntary." Enge4 370 U.S. at 430. Rather than dispute this allegation factually, based
on compulsory attendance laws, the Court simply noted that this point was irrelevant
to the constitutionality of the prayer. See id.
63 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, in concur-
rence, echoed Justice Frankfurter's sentiments in McCollum. See Illinois ex rel McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The
public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny."); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for
the 9reservation of a democratic system of government.").
6" McCollur, 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (noting that violation of the Establish-
ment Clause is not predicated on a finding of coercion).
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 232, 255 (1977) (upholding some cate-
gories of state funding to parochial schools and striking down others); Tilton v. Rich-
1997] 1047
1048 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1035
themselves, the only major case, Epperson v. Arkansas,67 involved an un-
enforced state statute that forbade the teaching of evolution. In Epper-
son, the Court invalidated the statute solely due to its purpose of advanc-
ing religious beliefs. 0
In the 1980s, however, at least three cases would give the Court the
opportunity to revisit the relationship between religion and the public
schools under the Establishment Clause. In the first of these, Stone v.
70Graham, the Court invalidated the posting of the Ten Commandments
in Kentucky public schools, finding that the "pre-eminent purpose for
posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls [was] plainly re-
ligious in nature."7 ' Again, the Court had no need to analyze the effect
of the challenged practice on children, striking down the statute in
question solely based on its clearly religious purpose.7
Next, in Wallace v. Jafftee," the Court revisited the school prayer is-
sue, albeit in the guise of an Alabama statute providing for "'a period of
silence... for meditation or voluntary prayer.'"74 As in Epperson and
Graham, the Court invalidated the statute in question because it lacked
a secular purpose.' Although the Court noted that the complaint
"alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 673-74, 689 (1971) (upholding federal assistance to church-
related institutions of higher learning); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07
(1971) (finding unconstitutional state programs supplementing parochial school
teacher salaries); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666-69, 680 (1970)
(upholding property tax exemptions granted to religious organizations); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (upholding law authorizing public schools to
lend textbooks free of charge to parochial school students).
67 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
CS See id. at 98.
As the Court noted, "[n]o suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be
justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its
citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason
for existence." Id. at 107-08 (footnote omitted). In other words, the effect on young
children of the particular curricular requirement was not relevant; the religious pur-
pose of the law made it unconstitutional.
70 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
71 Id. at 41. To those who might argue that the posting of the Ten Command-
ments was a matter unworthy of the Court's attention, the Court responded that "'it is
no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor en-
croachments on the First Amendment.'" Id. at 42 (quoting School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
7 See id. at 41.
73 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
74 Id. at40 n.2 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984)).
7 See id. at 56.
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religious indoctrination,"76 it found no need to rely on this contention
in its analysis of the statute. Rather, it indicated that in past cases "the
Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
select any religious faith or none at all."77 Therefore, a statute whose
purpose was to encourage the expression of religious faith in general
was constitutionally suspect. 8  In concurring opinions, both Justice
Powell and Justice O'Connor found the statute unconstitutional with-
out relying on any coercion present in the classroom context. 79
The final major "religion and public schools" case before the pres-
ent decade was Edwards v. Aguillard," another challenge to a religiously
based curriculum regulation.8' In Justice Brennan's majority opinion,
the Court for the first time appeared as if it would concentrate on
(rather than ignore or cite in dicta) "the particular concerns that arise
in the context of public elementary and secondary schools." 2 The
76 Id. at 42.
77 Id. at 52-53.
78 See id. at 56-60 & nn.43-44 (noting that the legislative history and testimony by
the statute's sponsor revealed the "wholly religious character" of the statute). The
Court did indicate, in a single footnote at the end of its 22-page opinion, that concern
regarding government endorsement of religious activity "has special force in the pub-
lic-school context where attendance is mandatory." Id. at 61 n.51.
Justice Powell specifically distinguished prayer in Wallace from the prayer in
Marsh, based on "the historical acceptance of the practice" in question in Marsh, not
based on the different audiences in the two cases. Id. at 63 & n.4 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor noted that the earlier school prayer cases had "acknowledged
the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, but they expressly turned only on the
fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise." Id. at 72 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Justice O'Connor also noted that the historical arguments from Marsh were inap-
plicable in the school context, not because there were adults at issue in Marsh and
children in Wallace, but because:
The simple truth is that free public education was virtually nonexistent in the
late 18th century. Since there then existed few government-run schools, it is
unlikely that the persons who drafted the First Amendment, or the state legis-
lators who ratified it, anticipated the problems of interaction of church and
state in the public schools. Even at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, education in Southern States was still primarily in private hands,
and the movement toward free public schools supported by general taxation
had not taken hold.
Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
8 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
81 See id. at 580-81. Here, the Court addressed a challenge to a Louisiana curricu-
lum regulation that required that any teaching of evolution be accompanied by the
teaching of "creation science." Id. at 581.
82 Id. at 585.
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Court's opinion began by noting both that "[s] tudents in such institu-
tions are impressionable"13 and that, as Justice Frankfurter explained in
his McCollum opinion, public schools are the most important tool for
"'promoting our common destiny.' 84  However, the Court's holding
did not rely on the special circumstances of the school setting but, as in
Wallace, found the statute unconstitutional because its legislative con-
text indicated "the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enact-
ing th [e] statute."5 In fact, the Court spent more time expressing con-
cern for the effect of the religiously motivated statute on adult teachers
than on young pupils.
8
As the handful of cases from the three decades following Schempp
clearly indicate, the Court continued to analyze challenges to religious
exercises in public schools under the broad Establishment Clause prin-
ciple of separating religious exercises and government institutions-
and not under a coercion analysis grounded in concern for the impres-
sionability of young children. In fact, from 1948 through the 1980s,
without exception, the Court found unconstitutional every incursion of
religion into the public schools, based on the requirement that gov-
ernment refrain from engaging in any religious activity and, in some
cases, on the importance of the public school institution as a symbol of
democracy and pluralism. It was against this background that the
Court considered the practice of official prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies in the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman.
7
83 Id. at 584.
84 Id. (quoting Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
85 Id. at 590 (emphasis added). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed
with the majority that the legislature "acted with the unconstitutional purpose of struc-
turing the public school curriculum to make it compatible with a particular religious
belief: the 'divine creation of man.'" Id. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring). As with the
majority, Justice Powell's concern was not with the effect on pupils, but with the gov-
ernment's "purpose of promoting a particular religious belief." Id.
86 See, e.g., id. at 586 n.6 (majority opinion) ("The Act actually serves to diminish
academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolution without also teaching
creation science, even if teachers determine that such curriculum results in less effec-
tive and comprehensive science instruction."); id. at 588-89 ("[U]nder the Act's re-
quirements, teachers who were once free to teach any and all facets of [scientific theo-
ries about the origins of humankind] are now unable to do so.").
Finally, as in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Wallace, the Court explicitly rejected
applying Marsh in the public school setting, as "a historical approach is not useful in
determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public
education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted." Id. at
583 n.4.
87 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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3. The Later Years
It is worth noting, when considering whether the Court would.ap-
ply Marsh to the practice of public school board prayer, that some
courts and commentators believed that the Court would (or should)
apply Marsh to the issue of graduation prayer-thereby finding it con-
stitutionally permissible.88 However, this was not to be the case. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee explicitly stated the "dominant facts"
that led to the Court's holding: "State officials direct the performance
of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremo-
nies for secondary schools."89 Justice Kennedy considered attendance at
the ceremonies "obligatory," not in the sense that a concrete detriment
(such as failure to receive a diploma) would befall absentees, but in
terms of the "intangible benefits" that would be lost by a student who
felt compelled to absent herself from the graduation ceremony." Jus-
tice Kennedy found that the "government involvement with religious
activity" in Lee was "pervasive."9' Most fundamentally, he declared that
the activity challenged in Lee violated the most basic precepts of the
First Amendment religion clauses:
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs
and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or pre-
scribed by the State. The design of the Constitution is that preservation
and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a
choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised free-
dom to pursue that mission.92
It was only at this point, after establishing that the underlying problem
in this case was government involvement in the "transmission of relig-
ious beliefs and worship,"93 that Justice Kennedy noted that these
See, e.g., Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987)
("The annual graduation exercises here are analogous to the legislative and judicial
sessions referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same principles."); Serra,
supra note 8, at 796-98 (suggesting that Marsh and its progeny would lead the Court to
uphold graduation prayer).
8 Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
90 Id. at 586, 595. Importantly, and surprisingly to many Court observers, Justice
Kennedy declined "the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to recon-
sider" the Lemon test, id. at 587, the Court's major Establishment Clause test, discussed
infra Part III.A.
91 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. Justice Kennedy based his conclusion on the fact that "from
a constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must oc-
cur," id., and the fact that the government official "directed and controlled the con-
tent of the prayers," id. at 588.
go- Id. at 589.
93 Id.
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"concerns have particular application in the case of school officials,
whose effort to monitor prayer will be perceived by the students as in-
ducing a participation they might otherwise reject.
" 94
It is Justice Kennedy's analysis of the "particular application" of the
basic First Amendment principles in the context of an audience of ado-
lescents 5 that received the most attention-and to which Justice
Scalia's dissent most directly responded. 96 Although fourJustices joined
Justice Kennedy's opinion, they all either wrote or joined concurring
opinions as well. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, failed to discuss the special issue of children and religion
altogether, instead reviewing the Court's long line of Establishment
Clause cases.97 He concluded by noting that "our cases have prohibited
government endorsement of religion, its sponsorship, and active in-
volvement in religion, whether or not citizens were coerced to con-
form. ' 8
94 Id. at 590.
95 See id. at 592-97. In his analysis of the public school context, Justice Kennedy
overstated the importance of this setting in the opinions in Engel and Schempp when he
noted that these cases "recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises in public
schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion." Id. at 592. For a discussion of
Engel and Schempp, see supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
even while discussing the particular problem of official religious exercises and young
people, Justice Kennedy reiterated the fundamental problem with state-sponsored
prayer, a problem inherent in any context: "It is a tenet of the First Amendment that
the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as
the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice." Lee 505 U.S.
at 596.
96 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 636-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's argument that
state officials have 'coerced' students to take part in the invocation and benediction at
graduation ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent."). As discussed
below, four of the Justices in the majority found no need to rely on a "psychological
coercion" argument to create a stricter Establishment Clause standard when children
were involved. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. Even Justice Kennedy
placed heavier reliance on general Establishment Clause principles than on any
"particular concerns" with the graduation context. See supra notes 89-93 and accom-
panying text. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White and Thomas, took issue primarily with the majority's supposed reliance on
a "boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion." Lee, 505
U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters would have upheld the graduation
prayer as "a tradition that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves,
and that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsec-
tarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally." Id. Analysis of the longstand-
ing historical practices argument can be found infra Part IIA1, while the history of
public schools is discussed infra Part I.B.3, and the notion of "nonsectarian prayer is
analyzed infra Part III.D.1.
V, See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599-609 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
98 Id. at 609.
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Justice Souter, also joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, ad-
dressed primarily two issues: whether the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to permit government endorsement of, and involvement in, re-
ligious exercises in a nonpreferential manner ' and whether an
Establishment Clause violation necessarily required an element of coer-
cion.' 0° His opinion, like Justice Blackmun's and like the first portion
ofJustice Kennedy's, focused on actions by any government entity that
"favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or one re-
ligion over others," and not on the particular concerns of the young
public school audience.'10  In the five years since Lee, the Supreme
Court has not had an opportunity to revisit the issue of religious in-
volvement in public schools.1e2
B. Public Schools and School Boards
The preceding Section demonstrates at least two overriding princi-
ples behind the Court's series of "religion and public schools" cases.
First and foremost, the Court has unalterably rejected any religious ex-
ercise in the public school context. The second portion ofJustice Ken-
nedy's opinion in Lee notwithstanding, the basis for this rejection has
not been concern for the undue influence on young minds, but has
been the Establishment Clause tenet of neutrality that requires a sepa-
99 See id at 609-618 (SouterJ., concurring).
100 See id. at 618-626. Justice Souter's opinion relied heavily on the history of the
Establishment Clause. Ultimately, he rejected the coercion test because he found no
support for such a narrow reading of the Establishment Clause in either the history of
its framing or the Court's long line of precedents, and because "a literal application of
the coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a virtual nullity," as it would
prohibit only government actions already forbidden under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 621; cf. Tr. of Oral Argument at 18, Lee (No. 90-1014) (Justice: "Do you have to
have the same level of coercion to satisfy... an establishment challenge, as you do a
free exercise challenge?" CharlesJ. Cooper, counsel for respondent: "Your Honor, I
cannot think of an instance where that might not be the case.").
101 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 627 (SouterJ., concurring).
102 The Court has decided a few Establishment Clause cases dealing with the pub-
lic schools since Lee v. Weisman, but I would characterize these cases as either funding
or accommodation cases in which the Court did not address the fundamental issue in
the cases discussed above, the participation of government in a religious exercise. See,
e.g., Board of Educ. of KiraysJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994)
(finding that the creation of a school district to serve the cultural needs of a particular
religious sect "crosse[d] the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible
establishment"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch; Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993)
(finding that "the Establishment Clause does not prevent [a public] school district
from furnishing [a pupil in a sectarian school] with a sign-language interpreter in or-
der to facilitate his education").
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ration between religious exercises and government authority. Second,
the Court has emphasized the importance of public schools in general
(and not simply the public classroom as a physical entity) as perhaps the
essential ingredient in our modem democratic and pluralistic society.
These principles inform the discussion below, which will distinguish the
setting of public school board meetings from that of the state legisla-
tures at issue in Marsh.
1. The Role of the Public School
The Supreme Court occasionally has discussed the importance of
public schools in contexts other than Establishment Clause challenges.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,'0 3 the Supreme Court
noted both the central role of the Bill of Rights in protecting minority
views from majority persecution'" and the importance of public schools
in our modem democratic society:
Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and
political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed,
party, or faction....
... That [school boards] are educating the young for citizenship is rea-
son for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ-
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes.'0 5
103 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (finding unconstitutional a statute that mandated saluting
the flag and reciting the pledge of allegiance).
104 In JusticeJackson's famous words:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638. Strict adherence to the Court's view in Barnettewould seem to preclude any
government prayers or religious expression justified as simply "beliefs widely held
among the people." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). But cf. Employ-
ment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("Values that
are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process."); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 679 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (arguing that communities
should be able to make "reasonable judgments" regarding which acknowledgments of
sectarian religious holidays are appropriate).
105 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
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In addition to the "secular instruction and political neutrality" that the
Barnette Court urged on public schools, the Court unanimously stated
four decades ago that "education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments" and is critical "to our democratic
society."106 Finally, the Court has noted the widespread agreement that
"public schools [are] an 'assimilative force' by which diverse and con-
flicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad but
common ground" and are places where "fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system" are inculcated.'07
The school board's role in fulfilling the above functions "is not con-
fined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach
by example the shared values of a civilized social order."" It is highly
questionable whether the values cited above of secular instruction, po-
litical neutrality, democracy and diversity will be taught by the example
of a school board sponsoring "a religious exercise in a governmental
institution."'09 In fact, some people believe that a strong argument in
favor of school board prayer is precisely the example that will be set for
students."0 Not surprisingly, some students have received the message
from prayers at school board meetings that they should also be able to
pray in school."'
106 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
107Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (upholding against an equal protec-
tion challenge a New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public
school teacher of any person who is not a United States citizen). Members of the
Court have expressed similar views regarding the role of schools in many other cases.
For example, in his dissenting opinion in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982),Justice Rehnquist noted the fundamental role of public schools "in inculcating
social values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people." Id. at 909
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The provision of education is one of the most important
tasks performed by government it ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.").
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (emphasis added);
cf E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR., LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTROL OF STUDENT ACTIVITIES BY
PUBLIC SCHOOL AuTHORmEs 53 (1970) ("How school personnel react to the chal-
lenge to their authority is... important not only for the function of the schools but
for the development of youths' general attitudes toward their government.").
109 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing
the official prayer that the state of New York required to be recited at the beginning of
each school day).
Io See, e.g., Betty Szubo, Letter, Praying Silently, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 1992, at
All (noting that "since [board members] were the people who made policy for the
schools in the district, they could set an example for the students by starting their
meetings with a prayer"); Nelson, supra note 16 (reporting that a school board mem-
ber voted to retain meeting prayers "because the board acts as a model for district stu-
dents").
I Cf Students to Carry Ball on Graduation Prayer, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 30, 1991, at
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Given that the "public schools... are expected to take the lead in
helping to create a society without prejudice and to promote the full
equality of all citizens,"" 2 religious worship in any official public school
setting is problematic. In fact, as one scholar noted: "[T]here is no
place in American life where the Establishment Clause should be more
clearly manifest than in America's public schools.... [T]he public
schools have a solemn obligation not only to teach the Constitution,
but also to uphold it by precept and practice. " s
2. School Board Meetings vs. Legislative Sessions
As an initial matter in examining the public school board meeting,
it is important to understand the procedural posture of cases such as
Engel and Schempp. In those cases, although particular school districts
were targeted as defendants, state statutes that granted the schools
authority to initiate the prayers or Bible reading were the ultimate tar-
get of the legal challenges.1 4 In the case of school board prayer, it is
unlikely that explicit statutory authority exists for such prayers, as the
role and authority of public school boards is one of limited scope, de-
fined by state legislation that typically delegates authority to run local
schools to elected (or occasionally appointed) officials in local commu-
nities."5 This limited authority of public school boards not only raises
the question of whether they have the power (let alone the constitu-
C8 (reporting that a student "wanted to know why students can't have prayer at
graduation but the school board commonly has prayer at the beginning of each of its
meetings").
11 James R. Kirkpatrick, Public Schools and the American Heritage of Religious Freedom
and Religious Pluralism, in RELIGION, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION 111, 113 (James E.
Wood, Jr. ed., 1984); see also WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION
374 (1995) ("[P]ublic schools have a particularly important role to play in nurturing a
sense of community, respect, and mutual understanding in a pluralistic and increas-
ingly fragmented culture."); Paul H. Hirst, Public and Private Values and Religious Educa-
tional Content, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 329, 329 (Theodore R. Sizer ed.,
1967) ("To anyone who cares about religious freedom and toleration, the American
public school is a magnificent attempt at maintaining the strictest religious neutrality
by the state while providing the best possible education for all.").
13 James E. Wood, Jr., Religion and Education: A Continuing Dilemma, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Nov. 1979, at 63, 70.
114 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 211
(1963) (citing state statutes that required reading from the Bible at the opening of
each school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 & n.1 (1962) (noting that the
board of education acted under state law in directing the principal to cause a prayer to
be recited aloud each day in class).
115 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-508, 5-510 (West 1992) (discussing the du-
ties and powers of Pennsylvania school boards).
PRAYER ATPUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD MEETINGS
tional right) to conduct prayer exercises at their official meetings, but
also serves as a foundation on which to examine the differences be-
tween state legislatures and local school boards.
The strictly limited authority of school boards is unlike that of state
and federal legislatures, which have wide-ranging powers over large
numbers of constituents."6 In addition, Congress is a coequal branch
of government to which the federal courts give great deference17 and
federalism concerns likewise restrict these courts from interfering with
the state legislative process."" School boards, however, present no such
problems."9 Although the Court has expressed concern about becom-
ing too intimately involved in curricular decisions of school districts,'20
11 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing powers of Congress); Blackwell v. State
Ethics Comm'n, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (Pa. 1989) (interpreting Article 2, § 1, of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution as vesting broad "power to make, alter, and repeal laws" in the
state legislature (internal quotations omitted)), aff'd on reh'g, 589 A.2d 1094 (Pa. 1991).
n7 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (applying "appropriate judi-
cial deference" to Congress when determining whether to create an implied cause of
action for an alleged constitutional violation). Unlike school districts' authority, Con-
gress's power to regulate its internal affairs is constitutionally based. See, e.g., U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("Each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members .... "); id. § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings .... "); id. § 6, cl. 1 ("[For any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
118 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (affirming state legisla-
tors' broad immunity from federal civil rights actions); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971) (citing comity, or "a proper respect for state functions," as justification
for federal court deference to state criminal proceedings). The Court has interpreted
the Eleventh Amendment broadly to provide virtually unlimited immunity for states,
but has explicitly refused to extend this immunity to school districts, finding the prin-
ciple of "sovereignty" underlying the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable in the case of
school districts. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Compare, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (limiting congressional power to subject States to federal
courtjurisdiction), with Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280-81 (1977) (declining to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to school dis-
tricts).
19 See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 819 n.9 (Cal. 1991)
(en banc) (noting that Marsh "is properly understood as deriving in part from theju-
diciary's deference to the legislative branch in the management of that branch's own
internal affairs," a deference "not implicated" in the case of graduation prayer); cf.
Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588, 597 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (declining to
apply the "historic reluctance of the courts to interfere in the internal affairs of legisla-
tive bodies" to a challenge to a police department chaplaincy); James J. Dean, Com-
ment, Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and the Establishment Claus4 16
FIA ST. U. L. REV. 1001, 1013 (1989) (noting that invocations at school events do "not
implicate the deference traditionally accorded another branch of government in the
internal ordering of its own affairs").
120 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 882 (1982) (Blackmun,J., concur-
ring) ("As the Court has recognized, school officials must have the authority to make
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it has not hesitated to impose constitutional constraints on school dis-
tricts when necessary.121
In the everyday sense as well, the "internal affairs" of a school board
are quite different from those of a state or federal legislature. Once
state or federal legislators are elected, they typically fulfill their official
roles by traveling to their capital cities and taking care of their business,
with most of their constituents residing far from the locus of legislative
action (and legislative prayer).'2 Because school boards usually cover
fairly small geographic areas and their meetings provide constituents an
intimate opportunity to comment on a narrow range of issues (for ex-
ample, local taxes, educational programs, building projects), citizen at-
tendance is more common, more expected and more visible:
The board of education meeting, which takes place all across the land
educationally appropriate choices in designing a curriculum ....").
121 Probably the most prominent example is the long line of school desegregation
cases, beginning with the remedial phase of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (ordering the district courts to take proceedings necessary to desegregate the
public schools with "all deliberate speed"). See also, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (holding that a district court could order remedial education programs for
schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of dejure segregation). Although
the Court has recently cut back on federal courts' authority to intervene in public
schools in order to effectuate desegregation, the principle underlying this change is
deference to states, not to the public schools themselves. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115
S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995) (invalidating portions of district court desegregation rem-
edy-which were supported by the school district itself-while noting the "federalism
concerns that are implicated when a federal court issues a remedial order against a
State").
In addition, in other areas, the Court has clearly distinguished between the defer-
ence due state legislators and that due local school board members. See, e.g., Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (declining to grant school board members the
same immunity from damages in federal civil rights actions that was granted to state
legislators in Tenney v. Brandhov, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)).
122 Cf Jacqueline P. Danzberger & Michael D. Usdan, Strengthening a Grass Roots
American Institution: The School Board, in SCHOOL BOARDS: CHANGING LOCAL CONTROL
91, 92 (Patricia F. First & HerbertJ. Walberg eds., 1992) (noting increasing centraliza-
tion of government decisionmaking with the exception of school boards, which "are
one of the last bastions of meaningful local government"). Although Danzberger and
Usdan celebrate the fact that school board officials usually "are representing the val-
ues of their local constituents," id. at 93, James Madison was concerned about the lack
of a "multiplicity of sects" at the local level, making it more likely at the local level than
at the national level that an elected majority would involve itself, through government,
in religious matters. See LYNDA BECK FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY? A
HIsTORICAL, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER 101-03
(1989) (discussing Madison's concern in this regard). But cf. f30 CONG. REC. 5,917
(1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (deflecting concern about the content of school
prayer if a constitutional amendment were passed because "the decision would be up
to countless local officials and school administrators across the country").
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-and on a regular basis-is one of democracy's last assembly places
where any citizen, by the simple virtue of being a taxpayer, student, par-
ent, or employee, can feel rightfully, even wrathfully, able to assert his
full authority to observe or even speak ....
123
One who objects to the Nebraska legislative prayer is not likely to be no-
ticed and commented upon; a local community member who stands up
and walks out of the school board meeting may not retain such ano-
nymity.
The proper role of the modem school system 24 and the community
involvement unique to public schools come together most prominently
at the regular school board meeting: "It is at the school-board meeting
that members discharge their responsibilities for public education in
the district. The school-board meeting is, therefore, of great signifi-
cance to the administration of public education."'23 In addition, "the
meeting provides the occasion for board members to pool judgment on
issues confronting them."126 Ultimately, "[b]oard meetings are con-
cerned with public business, and the school board has a public mission
to fulfill." 27 It is difficult to discern how religious worship is a means to
fulfill this "public mission" of addressing important public education
issues.
3. The Short History of the Public School
The second Part of this Comment will analyze the historical argu-
ments that were the basis for the Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers.
However, before doing so, it is worth noting that any problems with an
historical analysis are even more pronounced when the factual setting
for the issue at hand-the modem public school--did not exist at the
time of the Constitution's framing. The Supreme Court has often
noted the relatively short history of public schools in declining to apply
an historical analysis in this context: "[A] historical approach is not
useful in determining the proper roles of church and state in public
12 NATIONAL SCH. PUB. RELATIONS ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5; cf. Society of Separa-
tionists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 930 (Utah 1993) ("Marsh involved prayer be-
fore a state legislature whose floor sessions do not involve participation by the public
to the degree found in city council meetings.").
124 See supra Part I.B. 1.
125 STEPHEN J. KNEZEVICH, ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 324 (3d ed.
1975).
126 Id. at 325.
127 Id. at 326.
12. Cf infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the
time the Constitution was adopted." 9 Whether the focus is the general
one of public schools, the more specific topic of locally elected public
school boards, or the even more specific subject of this Comment-
invocations at public school board meetings-it is clear that no such
animal existed in 1787 nor, for the most part, even in 1866.30
As one education scholar put it, "the haphazard arrangements of
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries cannot be
considered true progenitors of the school systems we know today."' As
late as the first decades of this century, some states still did not have
compulsory education laws, '32 as many as thirty percent of school age
children in the South did not attend school at all,'" and public schools
that did exist were highly homogeneous in character.'3
Given the attitudes toward non-Protestant religions 13 and the pur-
pose of what little formal education did exist in the late eighteenth cen-
129 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987); see also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The simple truth is
that free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 18th century."). Justice
Scalia has made the same point in applying the Fourth Amendment to searches and
seizures in public schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390
n.1 (1995) ("Not until 1852 did Massachusetts, the pioneer in the 'common school'
movement, enact a compulsory school-attendance law, and as late as the 1870's only 14
States had such laws.").
130 See also infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
1 Michael B. Katz, The Oigins of Public Education: A Reassessment, in THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 91, 93 (B. Edward McClellan & William J. Reese
eds., 1988); see also LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 326-30 (rev. ed. 1967)
(noting that free, universally open public schools did not begin to develop until well
into the 19th century).
152 See EDGAR W. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 501 (3d rev. ed. 1951)
(noting that it was not until 1918 that all states had enacted laws mandating compul-
sory education). It was not until more than a century after the framing of the Consti-
tution that most states created the constitutional right to an education for all (white
male) children. See SAMUEL WINDSOR BROWN, THE SECULARIZATION OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 98-102 (1912) (citing education provisions of various state constitutions).
133 See PATRICIA ALBJERG GRAHAM, COMMUNITY AND CLASS IN AMERICAN EDU-
CATION, 1865-1918, at 15 (1974) (listing by region the percentage of children aged six
to fourteen attending school in 1910).
13 See id. at 9 (discussing the racial, ethnic, economic and religious homogeneity
in public schools during the late 19th and early 20th centuries).
135 See, e.g., ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 31 (1994) (noting that James Madison, in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson, indicated that some in New England opposed the Constitution's prohibition
on religious tests as "open[ing] the door for Jews, Turks and infidels"); see also infra
note 164 and accompanying text.
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tury,s6 it is difficult to know whether the Framers would have endorsed
prayers at the meetings of an entity (probably unforeseeable in their
time) charged with educating not only Protestants, but Catholics, Jews,
Muslims, Buddhists, atheists and others. Even if the Framers did ap-
prove of legislative prayer,'a7 it requires a great leap of faith or logic to
conclude that they approved of prayer at modem public school board
meetings. The latter practice not only did not exist at the time of the
Framing, but in many cases has been instituted only recently."s
Part I of this Comment has concentrated on the public school set-
ting. A parsing of the Supreme Court's consistent line of "religion and
public schools" holdings has been coupled with an explanation of the
unique role (and short history) of the public school system and the
characteristics that distinguish school boards from legislatures. From
this analysis, it would appear unlikely that the Court would apply the
narrow holding of Marsh to the situation of school board meeting pray-
ers. Nevertheless, as the only legislative prayer case the Court has de-
cided, arguments are inevitably made for extending Marsh to school
board meetings. 3 9 Therefore, it is helpful to examine more closely the
136 See, e.g., Scown v. Czarnecki, 106 N.E. 276, 279 (Ill. 1914) (quoting an Illinois
ordinance of 1787, which declared that "[r]eligion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged"); see also BROWN, supra note 132, at 98-99
(listing state constitutional provisions from the 18th and 19th centuries with language
similar to that in Czarnecki); Edwin Scott Gaustad, Church, State, and Education in His-
tofical Perspective, in RELIGION, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION, supra note 112, at 11, 19-20
(observing that a 19th century Massachusetts law against public school books favoring
"'any particular religious sect or tenet' . ... was only meant to say that the instruction
should be broadly Protestant, not narrowly the property of a single church"); cf. JOHN
HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 25-26
(1969) (noting that mid-19th century religious zealots called Horace Mann an atheist
because his proposal for "religious instruction" did not include indoctrination of pu-
pils in one particular sect).
137 Seesupra text accompanying notes 13-14.
3 See sources cited supra note 16. Whatever controversy may (or may not) have
surrounded the issue of legislative chaplains in the early Congresses, the attempt to
bring prayer to public school board meetings has been anything but noncontroversial.
See infra notes 242-43. This again reflects the transformation from a nation where a
homogeneous group of legislators could act upon matters such as "sins, repentance,
humiliation, divine service, reformation, mourning, public worship, funerals, true re-
ligion, chaplains, etc.," as the Continental Congress did, see PFEFFER, supra note 131, at
265, to one where even many of the smallest communities contain a sizable population
of nonmajority religionists, see generally MARTIN B. BRADLEY ET AL., CHURCHES AND
CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 1990 (1992) (presenting statistics on the
number of adherents to various religions).
9 See, e.g., Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 950 F. Supp. 1337, 1345 (N.D. Ohio
1996) ("The Court is of the view that the facts of this case are more closely associated
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underlying facts and the reasoning that the Court employed in Marsh.
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
A. Marsh v. Chambers
14
0
As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Marsh v. Chambers that
"the practice of opening [legislative] sessions with prayers by a state-
employed clergyman" did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. 141 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied al-
most exclusively on two related arguments: "historical patterns" and
"contemporaneous practices."' The Court briefly discussed certain
aspects of the Nebraska legislative prayer in question, finding no consti-
tutional infirmities even though the same Presbyterian chaplain had
been employed and paid with tax dollars for an unbroken period of six-
teen years and even though the "prayers [were] in the Judeo-Christian
tradition."'
43
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a lengthy dissent
in which he found that legislative prayer violated all three prongs of the
Lemon test,144 the standard Establishment Clause test at the time of
with the so-called legislative or public body prayer exception articulated in
Marsh....").
140 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
141 Id. at 786.
142 Id. at 790. As pointed out by Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Marsh, the
majority reached its conclusion without analyzing legislative prayer under the standard.
Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), discussed infra
Part IIIA See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the ma-
jority's analysis ignored Lemon even though the Eighth Circuit's decision, which the
Supreme Court reversed, relied explicitly on Lemon in striking down the practice of
legislative prayer. See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1982).
143 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793. In particular, the Court held that the continuous em-
ployment of a single minister from one denomination would be of concern only if the
reappointment stemmed from "an impermissible motive" and the content of the chap-
lain's prayer would be problematic only if it proselytized or advanced or disparaged a
particular faith. Id. at 793-95. On the latter point, the Court cited seemingly inconsis-
tent rationales for finding the content of the prayer acceptable, noting the chaplain's
abandonment of the explicitly Christian prayers that he gave for the first 15 years of
his tenure, id. at 793 n.14, while emphasizing that it was not the Court's job "to em-
bark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer," id. at 795.
But see id. at 823-24 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "clearly sectarian con-
tent of some of the prayers given by Nebraska's chaplain").
4 See id. at 797-801 (Brennan,j., dissenting). In brief, the Lemon test requires that
a governmental practice have a secular purpose, have a primary effect of neither ad-
vancing nor inhibiting religion, and not lead to excessive entanglement of govern-
ment and religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The test and
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Marsh. Justice Brennan discussed the constitutional principles of state
neutrality toward religion and separation of church and state.' 4  He
also directly criticized the majority's historical arguments, declaring
that "specific historical practice should not in this case override th[e]
clear constitutional imperative." 46 Finally, Justice Brennan discussed
the inherent problems of government-sponsored prayer, noting that,
unlike religious notations on coins or in national mottos, "[p]rayer is
serious business-serious theological business."
147
Marsh was seen as both a major departure from the Court's earlier
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.. and an opening to those who
had decried its earlier decisions striking down prayer in school and lim-
iting other governmental religious practices. 149 The decision remains
the Court's only holding to have explicitly approved official prayer in a
government setting) 5°
its application to prayer at school board meetings is discussed in fuller detail infra Part
IIIA.
145 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 80306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that freedom of
conscience, religious autonomy, prevention of the trivialization or degradation of re-
ligion, and avoidance of political divisiveness are assured by these principles).
14 Id. at 814; see also id. at 813-17 (arguing, among other things, that the practices
of the first Congress should not be dispositive).
147 Id. at 819; see also id. at 818-21 (reviewing various objections religious persons
might have to both sectarian and nonsectarian legislative prayers). Justice Stevens's
short dissenting opinion made a related point. See id. at 823-24 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "the tenure of the chaplain must inevitably be conditioned on the
acceptability" of the prayers he recites). For a discussion of the content of govern-
ment-sponsored prayers and the possibilities for "nonsectarian" prayers, see infra Part
III.D.1.
148 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 16, at 257 ("Marsh makes for a strange fit with the
Court's prior decisions."); M. Greg Crumpler, Note, Constitutional Law-Legislative
Chaplaincy Program Held Not to Violate the Establishment of Religion Clause-Marsh v.
Chambers, _ U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), 6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 143, 157 (1984)
("[T]he Court's holding that this particular chaplaincy program was constitutional is
irreconcilable with previous interpretations of the Establishment Clause and has the
potential for throwing Establishment Clause analysis into chaos."); The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Establishment of Religion: Separation and Accommodation of Church and State:
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. and Marsh v. Chambers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 143, 148
(1983) (predicting that "Marsh will lead to confusion in lower courts and state legisla-
tures regarding the allowable limits of government-sanctioned religious expression").
,4 See, e.g., TERESA L. DONOVAN ET AL, VOLUNTARY SCHOOL PRAYER: JUDICIAL
DILEMMA, PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 57 (1984) (arguing that Marsh "indicate[s] that the
door is open for a re-evaluation of the religion jurisprudence of recent years"); Serra,
supra note 8, at 778 (arguing that the Court is moving toward an Establishment Clause
analysis that is more tolerant of "government-sponsored religious practices").
Most recently, the Court rejected prayer at public school graduation ceremo-
nies in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Cf Moore v. Ingrebretsen, 117 S. Ct. 388
(1996), denying cert. sub nom. to Ingebretsen v.Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274,
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It is highly questionable, given the Court's failure to abandon its
stricter Establishment Clause tests for a Marsh-type historical analysis,",
whether it would apply Marsh in the context of public school board
meetings. In addition, the short history of public schools makes an his-
torical analysis even more inappropriate in this setting than in other
settings, such as the state legislative prayer context. However, because
it might be argued that the decision in Marsh provides the answer to the
question of the constitutionality of school board prayer, it is important
to analyze the Court's two justifications for its holding in Marsh before
independently analyzing the issue of school board prayer under the
Court's major Establishment Clause tests.
1. Historical Patterns
"Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary
violations of constitutional guarantees,"' 53 the Court said in Marsh, be-
fore ignoring its own admonition. At least two problems exist with the
idea that longstanding historical patterns can justify current violations
of the Constitution."4
a. Adverse Possession of the Constitution
First, from a purely logical perspective, past actions should have no
bearing on a constitutional analysis of current activity. A half-century of
unconstitutional police misconduct would not grant a law enforcement
279 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding Mississippi's school prayer statute unconstitutional). But
cf. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 967 (1993), denying cert. to 977 F.2d
963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding practice of prayer at public school graduations
when students were permitted to vote for the prayer).
151 See, e.g., Louis Hatcher, Comment, Lofty Neutrality: The Traditional Pregame Invo-
cation Versus the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, 20 CUMB. L. REv. 687, 710 (1989-
1990) ("The approach taken in Marsh has been strictly limited in its subsequent appli-
cation, being applied rarely, and then only in those cases where an aspect of history
and tradition exists.").
152 See supra Part I.B.3.
153 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
15 The discussion which follows in Parts 11.A.1-2 in no way covers the entire debate
over the use of history in constitutional interpretation. This issue is part of the larger
debate among academics, jurists and practitioners over the Constitution's meaning.
See generally MICHAELJ. GERHARDT & THoMAS D. RowE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECrIVrES 39-193 (1993) (discussing the ways in which jurists and
theorists argue about different sources of constitutional decisionmaking); Daniel A.
Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 1085 (1989).
This Comment will address only those aspects of the debate that are particularly appli-
cable to the Court's reasoning in Marsh and to the issue of school board prayer.
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agency adverse possession of the constitutional prohibitions on illegal
searches and seizures or violations of due process."' If the current gov-
ernment conduct (whether police brutality or legislative prayer) vio-
lates a constitutional provision, it is unconstitutional regardless of its
pedigree.
The idea that those who violate the Constitution can, in effect, gain
immunity for their longstanding transgressions is particularly trouble-
some, given that those who attempt to challenge unconstitutional con-
duct may be subject to reprobation which deters such challenges'
Some supporters of public prayer even advise those opposed to such
practices to protest silently, which, ironically, provides greater support
for the contention that the religious sentiments expressed are simply
those "widely held among the people."'5'8 Through this process, alleg-
15 Cf, e.g., PHILLIPJ. COOPER, HARDJUDICIAL CHOICES 297-98 (1988) (noting con-
stitutional violations by police in Philadelphia in the 1950s); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 382 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting district court findings of similar
problems in early 1970s); NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. filed
Sept. 4, 1996) (Settlement and Monitoring Agreement between community organiza-
tions and city aimed at reforming the Philadelphia Police Department, in 1996).
156 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion's
Role in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 607, 610-15 (1995) ("Of all the issues
the ACLU takes on ... by far the most volatile issue is that of school prayer. Aside
from our efforts to abolish the death penalty, it is the only issue that elicits death
threats." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also LAUBACH, supra note
136, at 26-29 (noting that during the mid-19th century in the United States, clashes
between Protestants and Catholics over the choice of Bibles and the religious teach-
ings to be used in public schools resulted in riots and deaths); Neil G. McCluskey, The
Nero Secularity and the Requirements of Pluralism, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION,
supra note 112, at 231, 244 ("The voices of moderates willing to discuss adaptation and
compromise were drowned out by the bigots and extremists....").
Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (describing
as "ludicrous" the notion that sitting silently during a prayer constitutes joining in the
praye5r).
.eMarsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (noting that "the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society").
But see Strossen, supra note 156, at 610 ("Especially given the political pressures on
school boards to bow to majoritarian forces, the religious liberty of individuals and
minority groups is always fragile."); Developments in the Lazo--Religion and the State: Ac-
commodation of Religion in Public Institutions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1656 (1987) ("The
establishment clause object of protecting religious minorities from majoritarian impo-
sition of religion is undermined if the majority's views govern the determination of
whether the majority's accommodation of its own 'widely held' religious beliefs vio-
lates the clause's guarantee.").
Under the logic of Marsh, the majority determines which beliefs are "widely held,"
acts accordingly, suppresses any dissenting voices, and maintains its own practices for
decades-allowing the Supreme Court to conclude that this "unbroken prac-
tice ... gives abundant assurance that there is no real threat" to the Establishment
Clause. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. But see FENWicK, supra note 122, at 164 (noting those
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edly unconstitutional conduct continues unopposed (or opposed but
persisted in nonetheless) for decades, eventually gaining constitutional
acceptance and becoming part of the foundation of support for more
serious constitutional transgressions. 59 Without this "slippery slope," it
is clear that the logic of Marsh would not apply to the context of public
school board meetings because the history of school boards themselves
is relatively shorte and the specific practice of opening school board
meetings with prayer is largely of recent vintage.'6'
b. Changing Times
The second problem with the "historical patterns" argument is that
it ignores changes in society and social attitudes.62 One can offer nu-
merous examples in which changes in social relationships, cultural atti-
tudes or material conditions led to the updating of constitutional juris-
prudence.'63 In the two areas most pertinent to this Comment, religion
arguments against school prayer that are based on the belief that school prayer tends
to alienate those of minority religions); Joe Loconte, Lead Us Not into Temptation: A
Christian Case Against School Prayer, POL'Y REV., Winter 1995, at 24, 25 (noting that
many Jews "were deeply troubled by the Protestant overtones in classrooms-
including prayers in the name of Christ and readings from the New Testament").
'"9 As one scholar noted:
Government proclamations of days of thanksgiving and occasionally prayer
are another illustration of ceremonial acts of government which are of slight
intrinsic significance but are of great importance in the use to which they are
put as precedents to justify far more substantial encroachments of govern-
ment on religious affairs or religion on government affairs. As a practical
matter there is no way in which the constitutionality of such proclamations
can legally be tested.... Accordingly their constitutionality is generally taken
for granted, and they become another item of evidence in the "common
sense" interpretation of the First Amendment.
PFEFFER, supra note 131, at 265. See generally id. at 238-50 (arguing that government
references to God are not inherently problematic but are nonetheless harmful be-
cause they provide precedential support for further violations of the Establishment
Clause). For recent evidence of Pfeffer's theory in practice, see County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670-73 & n.9 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (citing Thanksgiv-
ing proclamations and prayers at presidential inaugurations in support of an argument
for allowing additional religious expression by government).
16 See supra Part I.B.3.
161 Seesources cited supra note 16.
162 In a dissenting opinion written the year before Marsh, ChiefJustice Burger, the
author of the Marsh decision, made the same point. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 823 (1982) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that immunity for presidential
aides should be examined in the same way that the Court had examined immunity for
legislative aides: "in the context of the Constitution taken as a whole and in light of
20th-century realities" (emphasis added)).
16 Seventy years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, along with seven of his Su-
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and public education, changing attitudes also indicate the weakness of
"historical patterns" arguments to support constitutional violations.
Throughout the first century of this nation's history, the prohibi-
tion on an establishment of religion was not seen as incompatible with
the declaration that the United States "is a Christian nation.""6 Today,
even those advocating a view of the Establishment Clause that permits
nonpreferential government support for religion in general would hesi-
tate before declaring the nation a Christian one.'6 Religious pluralism
in the United States today is almost certainly much greater than it was a
century or two centuries ago.'6 Yet when government actions or judi-
cial determinations are justified by reference to the practices of these
less diverse and less tolerant eras, the effect is to nullify the broadening
of American culture and to codify the attitudes of an obsolete society.6
preme Court colleagues, sanctioned the forced sterilization of the mentally ill. See
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (justifying the practice with the famous line that
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"). Today, forced sterilization based
solely on unsupported allegations of mental illness would be seen not only as abhor-
rent, but as unconstitutional. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-
40 (1974) (noting that "freedom of personal choice" regarding matters of "family life,"
such as pregnancy, is protected by the Constitution).
16 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (basing
this observation on "a view of American life, as expressed by its laws, its business, its
customs, and its society"); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890) (noting
that the government may punish acts "recognized by the general consent of the Chris-
tian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory legislation"); Vidal v. Gi-
rard's Ex'r, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 199 (1844) (noting that "a devise in Pennsylvania for
the establishment of a school or college, for the propagation ofJudaism, or Deism, or
any other form of infidelity ... is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian country").
16 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging as an unconstitutional establishment of religion government action
that endorses certain "details upon which men and women who believe in a benevo-
lent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the
Divinity of Christ)").
16 See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS: RELIGIOUS CREEDS at xxi-
xxii (J. Gordon Melton ed., 1988) (noting that the encyclopedia lists more than 450
different creeds in 22 different "religious families"). In 1990, one study found that
almost half of the population of the United States was not an "adherent" of a Christian
church. See BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at xiv, 1-3 (finding that "all members, in-
cluding full members, their children and the estimated number of other regular par-
ticipants" in 134 Christian church bodies is less than 56% of the total population).
Clearly, many of the other 44% consider themselves Christians, if not members of a
church. Still, a large minority of Americans are neither "adherents" of a Christian
church nor nonparticipating Christians. See, e.g., GALLUP, supra note 32, at 25, 42, 47
(finding that 17% of Americans in 1994-1995 identified themselves as neither Catholic
nor Protestant).
167 Presumably, the codification will become permanent until a sufficiently large
minority of constituents of the relevant government entity convince that entity to alter
its longstanding practice. Cf. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
1997] 1067
1068 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:1035
In the area of public schools, the expectations for the institution,
the nature of the student body, and the school's relationship to the
larger community have changed tremendously. Once again, one must
ask if practices that may have been seldom challenged'68 in the context
of eighteenth and nineteenth century "public schools" are immune
from appropriate constitutional analysis in the context of the modem
pluralistic public school, given that "the traditional role of the public or
common school in the transmission of agreed-upon moral and spiritual
values has almost totally changed." 9 In fact, the public school has un-
dergone a transformation from the early nineteenth century
"nondenominational" Protestant school to the modem, truly common
school. 70 At the end of the nineteenth century, the top education offi-
cial in the federal government, N-P. Peabody, said:
We are by profession a Christian people. We recognize the great prin-
ciples of religion in the devotional services in our legislatures and our
courts of justice. Shall our children be trained as citizens without the
inculcation of these fundamental religious ideas which will impress
upon them the significance of prayer and the dread solemnity of an
oath?1
7 '
Constitutional jurisprudence that relies on historical practices contem-
poraneous with such sentiments may result in outcomes desirable to
those who believe "we are... a Christian people," but such jurispru-
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in ... ."). For criticism of the "majority rules" principle in the context
of government religious activity, see Cammack v. Waihee, 944 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir.
1991) ("While official recognition of any or all religions is prohibited by the constitu-
tion, the preference of the majority religion over all others is certainly among the
principal offenses the first amendment condemns." ), dissentingfrom denial of reh'g en
banc932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 Although it is impossible to determine how much silent opposition existed to
government practices offensive to minority religions, occasional protests did occur.
See PFEFFER, supra note 131, at 436-44 (discussing disputes over Bible reading in
schools, from the 1840s through 1880s); see also supra note 156.
169 McCluskey, supra note 156, at 233-34.
170 See id. at 233-38; cf. Talcot Parsons, The Nature of Ameaican Pluralism, in RELIGION
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 112, at 249, 250 ("[American society] has moved
from largely negative toleration of non-Protestants to their inclusion in a denomina-
tionally pluralistic community, the pluralism of which comprises all the most impor-
tant religious groups of Western history."). See generally BROWN, supra note 132, at 1-3
(discussing factors behind the gradual disappearance of religious influences on public
education).
171 A.P. Peabody, Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for the
Year 1897-1898, at 1563-64 (quoted in Arthur Gilbert, Reactions and Resources, in
RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 112, at 37, 42).
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dence risks closing the modem courthouse-or schoolhouse-door on
anyone not within A.P. Peabody's limited definition of society.
2. Contemporaneous Practices
Analysis of the practices of the Constitution's Framers is not an un-
common tool of constitutional interpretation. As the Court argued in
Marsh, perhaps oversimplifying, "their actions reveal their intent."17 2
Nevertheless, this mode of analysis contains a number of problems.
a. The Infallible Framers?
Most fundamentally, it is not necessarily true that the men who
made up the first Congresses and framed the First Amendment were
always consistent in their constitutional handiwork and their legislative
actions. In at least one prominent case, the Supreme Court found oth-
erwise.'73 ChiefJustice Marshall held that the judicial authority granted
the Court, by a 1789 act passed by the first Congress, "to issue writs of
mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the consti-
tution."'7 4 Apparently, "their actions" in passing the Judiciary Act '75 did
not "reveal their intent" regarding Article III of the Constitution.
There are a number of reasons why the actions of the Framers
might not be good indications of their intent. First, whatever honor
may be due them, the Framers were politicians. Creating a constitu-
tional bulwark against government-religion entanglement may have
been both laudable and popular, but eliminating practices that suppos-
edly demonstrated a legislator's belief in the Almighty probably was not
worth the political fallout in the 1789 Congress any more than it would
have been in the 1983 Nebraska legislature. 7 6 Particularly given the
17 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
173 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, as written by the first Congress, granted unconstitutional authority to
the udicial branch).
Id. at 176.
1Z Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3041
(1994)).
176 James Madison was well aware that politicians might not adhere to the letter or
spirit of their own constitutional creations. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRMNGS OF JAMES MADISON 269, 272 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1904) ("[E]xperience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occa-
sions when its controul is most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment bar-
riers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State."). In the specific
context of religion, the difficulty of reconciling electability by a majority with the pro-
tection of minority views has been noted by modem commentators. See MILLER, supra
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Constitution's elimination of any religious test for office, the pressure
on politicians to demonstrate their godliness in some other manner
may have been too strong to resist.
Second, as with the Judiciary Act, the Framers may have taken legis-
lative actions that they believed to be constitutional (or whose constitu-
tionality they mayt have never considered), but whose consistency with
the Constitution becomes more questionable under the light ofjudicial
analysis and the reflection provided by the passage of time.'78 More-
over, certain practices, including the use of legislative chaplains, pre-
dated the framing of the Constitution and may have been carried for-
ward without much thought as to how the new constitutional frame-
work affected their status.17 9
note 1, at 41-46 ("The careful inoffensiveness of public office leads straight to the
semi-secular religion or the semi-religious secularism which is both a convenient com-
promise among the wide variety of positions to which officialdom must be attentive
and a very popular position in its own right."); see also PAUL BLANSHARD, GOD AND MAN
IN WASHINGTON 96 (1960) ("Th[e] technique of accommodation employed by Con-
gressmen in handling religious issues.... is part of the process of avoidance and ad-
justment that every successful politician must master if he wishes to stay in office in a
democracy.").
This point holds true as well for the President, whose religious proclamations are
often cited in efforts to expand the scope of permissible government religious exer-
cise. See supra note 159; cf. Clinton, supra note 31.
17 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("[N]p religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
17 Again, the best example is Marbuiy v. Madison. For another example, consider
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Less than a decade after passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act aimed at, among other things,
private discrimination, obviously believing the Amendment granted it the power to do
so. The Court held otherwise, apparently not convinced that legislators were the best
interpreters of the scope of a constitutional provision they had so recently framed. See
id. at 10-11. In some cases, the Framers themselves may have disagreed, upon reflec-
tion, with their own alleged intent. Compare Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 n.8
(1983) (noting that James Madison "voted for the bill authorizing payment of
[Congressional] chaplains"), with Elizabeth Fleet ed., Madison's "Detached Memoranda,"
3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558 (1946) (excerpting an 1820 letter by James Madison which
asserted that legislative chaplaincies were violations of the Establishment Clause, as
well as "a palpable violation of equal rights").
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Souter made the same point regarding the Free Speech
Clause, noting that "[t]en years after proposing the First Amendment, Congress
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, measures patently unconstitutional by modern
standards." 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter noted
that such practices of the first Congresses could have indicated "at best, that the Fram-
ers simply did not share a common understanding" of certain constitutional provisions
or "at worst, that they, like other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals one day
and turn their backs on them the next." Id.
1 In at least one case, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional just such a
practice which predated the Constitution and continued in force following its passage.
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Finally, it is impossible to determine, from their actions or from
other clues, what the "intent" of the Framers was, because it is impossi-
ble for an entire body of legislators (or, for that matter, an entire na-
tion) to have a single "intent." Indeed, it is entirely plausible that the
Framers' "intent" was to provide an overall structure of national gov-
ernment and a system of federalism, with certain clear limitations, pro-
hibitions and rights, and other general principles to guide future gen-
erations.'8 '
b. The Static Constitution?
As discussed above,'s2 one flaw in pure history-based constitutional
SeeMcDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating state
constitutional provision barring ministers from holding public office despite the fact
that it was a practice "carried from England by seven of the original states" and con-
tinued in a number of states well into the 19th century).
180 The Court has acknowledged this fact when attempting to discern the motive of
legislators. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("It is difficult or
impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the
choices of a group of legislators.").
To avoid this problem with regard to the First Amendment, Justices and commen-
tators often resort to the alleged intent ofJames Madison to determine the intent of
the Amendment. Aside from the obvious concern with ascribing the intent of one
(admittedly important) Framer to the entire Congress and the states, there is less than
universal agreement regarding Madison's own actions and intent. Compare Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 n.8 (1983) ("It bears note thatJames Madison ... voted
for the bill authorizing payment of the chaplains."), with LEONARD W. LEW, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 120 (2d ed. rev. 1994)
(noting that there is no evidence that Madison voted for the bill authorizing payment
of legislative chaplains), and SMrrH, supra note 16, at 244 ("The basic principles infus-
ing Madison's objection [in 1820] to a paid chaplaincy are identical to those that re-
mained throughout his lifetime.").
181 Given the prevalence in the 18th century of both natural law and common law
methods ofjudicial analysis, it seems particularly inappropriate to imbue the Framers
with the "intent" of codifying specific practices as permissible (or prohibitory) for time
immemorial. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127, 1145 (1987) (noting that the colonists believed that "judges were to look to
natural law and the inherent rights of man, as well as to the written constitution, in
determining the validity of a statute"). Consider the terminology used in many of the
constitutional provisions, such as "respecting," and "abridging," U.S. CONST. amend. I,
.unreasonable," and "probable cause," id. amend. IV, "public danger," id. amend. V.
These are hardly the phrases one would use if the intent was to establish black-and-
white rules, having the exact same meaning when applied to similar facts, whether in
1787 or in 1983. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
(finding that a constitution requires "that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those ob-
jects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves").
182 For a discussion of the role of historical changes in constitutional interpreta-
tion, see supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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analysis is the failure to acknowledge that social, cultural and material
conditions change dramatically over decades, let alone over centuries.
Given the Framers' awareness of both the practical difficulties and the
inappropriateness of regular constitutional modification,ss along with
their intention to provide a document as useful to future generations as
to their own,""s it is not always wise to use their conduct during the
eighteenth (or nineteenth) century to determine what is constitutional
today.
On numerous occasions, the Court has recognized this reality,
modifying an interpretation of the Constitution which is no longer con-
sistent with social, cultural or material realities.'s 5 Given the need of the
Constitution to speak to modem times, as well as colonial ones, this
modification is sometimes necessary even when the original interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision appears supported by actions of the
provision's Framers.1
8 6
183 See U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing supermajoritarian requirements for amending
the Constitution); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
("The constitution is... a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means....").
184 See U.S. CONST. preamble (indicating the purpose of the Constitution as
"secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity" (emphasis added)).
181 InJustice Brandeis's oft-quoted words, "in cases involving the Federal Constitu-
tion, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this court
has often overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In determining
whether to alter its interpretation of the Constitution, one consideration the Court
has used is whether an earlier decision's "premises of fact have so far changed ... as to
render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue
it addressed." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855
(1992).
186 In the same Congress in which the Fourteenth Amendment was framed, a bill
was passed providing for the funding of segregated schools in the District of Colum-
bia. SeeAn Act Relating to Public Schools in the District of Columbia, ch. 217, 14 Stat.
216 (1866). This "contemporaneous practice" of segregation was given a stamp of ap-
proval by the Supreme Court in the years following the Amendment's passage. See,
e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (finding segregation consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment). Yet by the middle of the next century, the same
Fourteenth Amendment was held to prohibit segregated schools. See Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that separate educational facilities violate
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(finding that segregated schools in the District of Columbia violate the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause). It is worth noting, in light of the discussion of "historical
patterns," see supra Part IIAL, that segregation was a centuries-long practice
(including its forerunner, slavery) at least as "traditional" and entrenched as legislative
prayer. See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1964)
(closing of public schools to avoid desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (resistance by the state of Arkansas to the invalidation of segregated schools).
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In addition, the Framers probably could not have anticipated every
future circumstance that would require constitutional adjudication.
They most likely did not foresee such modem phenomena as the per-
sonal computer or the automobile. Yet the Constitution they created
must speak to these issues even if the Framers themselves could not.1
7
Similarly, most of the Framers probably did not foresee the wide diver-
sity of religious (and irreligious) viewpoints, beliefs and faiths that
would arise in (or emigrate to) their new nation. Just as the Court can-
not abstain from interpreting the Constitution's application to personal
computers or automobiles, it should not limit its interpretation of the
Establishment Clause to an examination of the practices of political
leaders who acted without knowledge of the religiously pluralistic na-
tion to come. One First Amendment scholar made this point recently
in relation to the topic of legislative chaplains and Madison's alleged
support for the same:
Perhaps, in a nation with a predominantly Christian population and
with a Congress almost totally of that persuasion, Mr. Madison felt con-
frontation on this point was a collision on an unessential issue. We do
not know, but in [today's] multicultural mix ... Madison just might
have seen the chaplaincy as indeed a collision over an essential point.
We don't know, and we must pose the question for ourselves, not for
our distinguished forebear. 18
In short, looking to the eighteenth or even nineteenth century to
determine what is constitutionally permissible today would lead to a
number of results that are almost universally considered unaccept-
able.' 9 The point is not that contemporaneous practices are irrelevant,
but simply that they are far from determinative of what the Constitution
187 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996) (holding
that a $2 million punitive damages award against an automobile manufacturer for
nondisclosure of a product defect was unconstitutionally "excessive"); ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that portions of a federal statute regu-
lating content on the Internet were unconstitutional under the First Amendment Free
Speech Clause), prob.juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); see also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (creating "automobile exception" to Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement).
188 ALLEY, supra note 135, at 67-68; cf. LEW, supra note 180, at 117 ("[S]trict con-
struction of the First Amendment, if ever taken seriously, would lead to the destruc-
tion of basic rights."); Malla Pollack, Prayer in Public Schools: Without Heat, How Can
There Be Light, 15 QLR 163, 183-84 (1995) (arguing that a true adherence to the
Framer's practices and intent regarding religious freedom and establishment of relig-
ion would lead to protection only for Christians (and possibly only Protestants), a re-
sult clearly at odds with any modern judicial interpretation of the First Amendment).
189 See, e.g., supra note 186.
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means in the context of today's world.'9
B. Other Government Prayer Cases
As a bridge between the preceding analysis of Marsh and an inde-
pendent analysis of school board prayer,'9 ' it would be useful briefly to
survey the handful of decisions by state and lower federal courts that
have addressed the issue of local legislative prayer.
1. Pre-Marsh Cases
Fifteen years before the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court held, in Lincoln v. Page, ' that the
practice of "inviting various local clergymen to open the annual and
special meetings of [a] town with an invocation" was constitutional.'9 3
The court's short opinion relied primarily on the specific facts of the
case 9 4 and the court's belief that "any and every reference to the Deity
[does not] constitut[e] an establishment of religion" under the First
Amendment.' ' More than a decade later, two courts would decide leg-
islative prayer cases within three months of each other. In the first,
Bogen v. Doty,'96 a federal appeals court affirmed a district court's hold-
ing that a Minnesota county's practice of "inviting a local clergyman to
give a prayer immediately prior to the commencement of each Board
meeting" did not violate the Establishment Clause. '' After reviewing
facts similar to those in Lincoln, the court noted that the Supreme
Court had recognized "a corridor where certain practices that affect re-
190 At his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Justice Breyer made a similar
point when asked whether he would look to historical patterns to analyze Establish-
ment Clause questions, explaining that "of course you look at history, and you look at
tradition, and you look at the current world as we live [in] it in the United States." The
Nomination of Stephen Breyer to the Supreme Court: Heatings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 123 (1994).
See infra Part III.
192 241 A.2d 799 (N.H. 1968).
193 Id.
194 For example, the court found significant the rotation of clergy, the lack of any
public expenditures to support the invocation, and the fact that the invocation was
.not composed, selected or approved" by any government official or a part of the offi-
cial agenda of the town meeting. Id. at 800.
The court listed the familiar litany of "religious references in proclamations by
mayors, governors and presidents." Id. But see supra note 159 and accompanying text
(describing process by which such unchallengeable religious references are used to
justify greater incursions on First Amendment rights).
196 598 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1979).
197 Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted).
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ligion in some manner, or carry a religious connotation, are permissi-
ble in some phases of our governmental operation."'O8 The court found
no Supreme Court cases on point, applied the Lemon test, and found no
constitutional problem.'
In the second 1979 case, Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Genera2' 0' the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state legislature's
practice of opening its sessions with prayer did not present a constitu-
tional problem.20' Although this decision was obviously superseded
(and its holding indirectly affirmed) by the decision on the same issue
in Marsh, it is important for at least one reason-the fact that the Mas-
sachusetts court would later distinguish its decision in this case from
situations dealing with public schools. For example, in Kent v. Commis-• • 202
sioner of Education, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedents as
"prohibit[ing] religious observances on public school property even
when these are nondenominational."203 Refusing to apply its earlier leg-
islative prayer decision, it invalidated a state statute allowing for prayers
led by student volunteers despite the fact that the court found no evi-
dence that the pupils mistook the prayer for part of the official school
day. 
204
In a case decided just two years prior to Marsh, the NewJersey Su-
preme Court gave its stamp of approval to local municipality prayer, in
198 Id. at 1113.
109 The court listed the secular purpose and the primary effect of the invocations
as "establishing a solemn atmosphere and serious tone for the board meetings." Id.
As to the entanglement prong, the court noted the potential for divisiveness inherent
in the practice, but did "not see this divisive potential as being of the same caliber as
the annual appropriation of public funds anticipated but forbidden in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man." Id. at 1114.
It is interesting to note one district court's interpretation of the decision in Bogen,
when presented with the argument (before the Supreme Court had decided the issue)
that graduation prayers were constitutional under Bogen:
[Bogen] rested on a very scanty stipulation of facts, and the case must be
viewed in its slim factual context. The case does not stand for the broad
proposition that any governmental public function or ceremony may consti-
tutionally be opened with a religious invocation. In fact, the court warned of
the "quagmire" the county was near.
Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531, 536 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
20D 392 N.E.2d 1195 (Mass. 1979).
201 See id. at 1201 (stating that "[neither] the Massachusetts [nor] United States
Constitutions require the cessation of the practices challenged here").
02 402 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass. 1980).
203 Id. at 1343.
24 See id. at 1345 & n.13.
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Marsa v. Wernik 5 At the time the practice was challenged, members of
the borough council gave the invocations, although previously local
clergy had been invited to give invocations, as in Lincoln and Bogen.2 '
The court cited prior Supreme Court dicta on the constitutionality of
"courts and legislatures open [ing] official sessions with prayer or the
mention of God," °0 and proceeded to affirm the trial court's findings of
a legitimate secular purpose and no primary effect of advancing relig-
ion.20°
2. Post-Marsh Cases
Not surprisingly, there have been fewer reported legislative prayer
cases since the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh. In a 1988 case, the
Eighth Circuit found no constitutional violation under the particular
facts of a government hospital's chaplaincy program, but rejected the
notion that the historical analysis in Marsh "support[s] a rule permit-
205 430 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1981).
206 See id. at 891.
207 Id. at 895 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
212-13 (1963)); see also id. at 899 (listing state and federal legislative invocations, "In
God We Trust" inscription on coins, and use of "God" in Pledge of Allegiance). But see
PFEFFER, supra note 131, at 238-42, 265 (arguing that references to God or Christ in
official utterances or acts do not "justify practices that raise substantial and practical
state-church problems").
208 The court found "it significant that there has been no express avowal that the
purpose of the opening exercise is religious in whole or in part." Marsa, 430 A.2d at
896. The problem with this reasoning is that almost two decades after the Court in
Schempp first discussed the "secular purpose" prong and a decade after it was codified
in Lemon, it would be a monumental event for a government official to profess to a relig-
ious purpose in any official action. The court also noted that the "opening exercises
do not purport to be part of a religious program. They are part of a municipal legisla-
tive session." Id. This, however, assumes away the heart of the plaintiff's complaint,
that prayer should remain as "part of a religious program" and not as "part of a mu-
nicipal legislative session." Id.209
In its analysis of the effects prong, the court again relied on circular reasoning
to conclude that the municipal prayer did not have a primary effect of advancing relig-
ion:
The exercise in its contextual setting is not suggestive of religion or religious
ritual; it is conducted as part of a legislative session before a local legislative
body. While the opening exercise is conducted by individual council mem-
bers, and to that extent is under an official aegis, it does not purport to be
otherwise officially sponsored or authorized ....
Id. at 899. Again, the court essentially rejected a challenge to legislative prayer be-
cause it was legislative prayer. Further, it somehow found prayer by government offi-
cials during official government meetings not to be "officially sponsored or author-
ized." Id.
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ting state sponsored chaplaincies of any stripe."2 '0 The Fourth Circuit
similarly declined to apply Marsh in a government prayer case, finding a
state judge's practice of opening his court sessions with prayer unconsti-
tutional under a Lemon analysis.21' The court read Marsh as "predicated
on the particular historical circumstances presented in that case" 2 and
found, even under a broader reading of Marsh, that it was "difficult to
say that prayer by ajudge in the courtroom is comparable to legislative
prayer."213 Finally, in 1993, a state supreme court upheld, against a state
constitutional challenge, a municipality's custom of opening meetings
with an invocation.1 4
As this line of cases indicates, state and lower federal courts have
used various methods of analysis to determine the constitutionality of
local government prayer. The final Part of this Comment undertakes
an independent analysis of this issue, focusing on school board prayer
and using the Court's major Establishment Clause tests as the founda-
tion for the analysis.
210 Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 1988).
21 See North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d
1145, 1147-49 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Marsh and applying the Lemon test), cert. de-
nied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992). The court affirmed the district court's finding that theju-
dicial prayer violated all three prongs of Lemon and found that the prayer had an
"intrinsically religious" purpose, see id. at 1150, and that the nature of the prayer as
part of an official government proceeding violated both the effects and entanglement
prongs of Lemon. See id. at 1150-52.
2 Id. at 1148; cf. Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 95 F.3d 202, 213
(2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting application of Marsh to a challenge to religiously oriented
alcohol rehabilitation program because Marsh "relied heavily on the long tradition of
public prayer in th[e] context" of state legislatures).
213 Constangy, 947 F.2d at 1149.
214 SeeSociety of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). This
case presented at least two facts which contrast with most other municipal prayer
cases. First, the "invocations" in question were offered by "a wide variety of community
organizations, churches and individuals," rather than simply local clergy or elected
officials. Id. at 918 n.2. Second, the city council "invited the presentation of thoughts,
readings and invocations," as opposed to simply prayers. Id. The court, after discuss-
ing the long history of oppression of Utah's religious majority, which led to the en-
actment of the religion clauses of the state constitution, see id. at 921-29, noted that
there was no indication "the City Council favored particular religions or religion in gen-
eral in scheduling participants" for its invocations, see id. at 939 (emphasis added); cf.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("If the State
had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one
of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious mes-
sage, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State.").
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
As noted, the Court's major Establishment Clause test for the past
quarter-century has been the so-called Lemon test. Below I will examine
school board prayer under this test, as well as under the "endorsement"
test which Justice O'Connor has advocated as a recapitulation of Lemon,
and under the "coercion" analysis which Justices Kennedy and Scalia
have advocated, in slightly different forms. I will conclude by examin-
ing two arguments sometimes put forth by government prayer propo-
nents: that government prayer is constitutional as simply a permissible
expression of "civic religion" or that such prayer is compelled, when de-
sired by citizens or elected officials, by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment.
A. The Lemon Test
The Lemon test 5 has been around for a quarter of a century and
, 216criticism of the test for almost as long. I will assume, for the purpose
of analyzing school board prayer, that the test is both a valid means of
evaluating Establishment Clause challenges and still a living organism,
if perhaps only on life support.27 The test requires that a government
action meet three "prongs": first, that the action have a secular pur-
pose; second, that the primary effect of the action not be to advance or
inhibit religion (or a particular religion); and third, that the action not
215 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
216Although some courts and commentators have pronounced the death of
Lemon, this may simply be wishful thinking on the part of those who believe the test is
too difficult a hurdle for the state when it acts in the field of religion. Criticism of
Lemon, however, serves the purpose of permitting lower courts to ignore its framework
in favor of whatever test they feel is most appropriate. See, e.g., Chaudhuri v. Tennes-
see, 886 F. Supp. 1374, 1383-87 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (arguing that the Court in Lee
"abandoned the traditional test" from Lemon in favor of a coercion test and then pro-
ceeding to adoptJustice Scalia's dissenting opinion from Lee and the trial court's own
reading of constitutional history as the basis for rejecting a challenge to sectarian
graduation prayer).
217 In a post-Lee decision,Justice Blackmun defended the use of Lemon and pointed
out the continued validity of its underlying principles:
I write... to note my disagreement with any suggestion that today's decision
signals a departure from the principles described in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The
opinion of the Court... relies upon several decisions.., that explicitly rested
on the criteria set forth in Lemon. Indeed, the two principles on which the
opinion bases its conclusion that the legislative Act is constitutionally invalid
essentially are the second and third Lemon criteria.
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994)
(Blackmun,J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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create an excessive entanglement between government and religion.
The first two prongs actually date at least as far back as 1963 and
Schempp,21 while the entanglement prong was explicitly outlined in the
1970 Walz decision.1
1. Purpose Prong
Because the Lemon test requires only that a government action have
a secular purpose (and not primarily a secular purpose), the first prong is
not normally a very difficult test to meet. However, with government
religious activity in the public school context, problems have often
arisen in the purpose arena.220 In the cases that have applied Lemon to
government-sponsored prayer, the only purpose put forth has been, in
one form or another, "to solemnify governmental proceedings."221 Al-
though analysis of whether prayer can ever be anything other than an
explicitly religious activity will be deferred until later,2 it is highly ques-
tionable whether the purpose of prayer at school board meetings is to
create a solemn atmosphere.2 First, unlike legislative or congressional
218 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
("[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
(citations omitted)).
219 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) ("We must also
be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion."). Justice Jackson expressed similar sentiments in a dissenting opinion
more than two decades earlier, noting that the First Amendment religion clauses were
"intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's
hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public
life." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
220 In fact, in each of the Court's "religion and public schools" cases from the late
1960s through 1992, the purpose of the challenged government action was the key to
the constitutional violation. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text. This may
be because, as one court put it in summarizing a number of these precedents,
"controlling caselaw suggests that an act so intrinsically religious as prayer cannot
meet, or at least would have difficulty meeting, the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test." North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145,
1150 (4th Cir. 1991).
t21 Marsa v. Wernik, 430 A.2d 888, 899 (NJ. 1981).
See infra note 259 and Part III.D.1.
Although government officials who engage in religious activity will almost al-
ways aver an alleged secular purpose to inoculate their conduct from constitutional
challenge, but cf. supra note 208, the courts should be "capable of distinguishing a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985)
(O'Connor,J., concurring). This is easier in some cases than in others. For example,
in Jager v. Douglas County School District, the practice of offering prayers prior to high
school football games was challenged. SeeJager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d
824 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989). The school district offered as an ex-
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224prayer, invocations at public school board meetings appear to be a
fairly new-and not yet widespread-innovation.2 Given this reality,
one must ask what difference exists between the many school boards
that continue to function without "solemnizing" their meetings and
those that have found the recent need to do so.
Although lacking the factual record of a trial, it is possible to sur-
mise the purpose behind the introduction of school board prayer in
many of the situations in which the practice has been reported. These
accounts consistently indicate an effort to return God to the schools.
Whether intended as an example of proper religiosity for studentsY2 to
prove government officials' allegiance to God (or even, in many cir-
cumstances, to a particular God), 7 or simply to put the official impri-
pert witness a college football coach, who testified that "the invocation has a very
strong positive, if you want to use the term 'secular,' that's certainly appropriate, effect
on both the participants and the people in the stands." Hatcher, supra note 151, at
715 n.184. Despite this apparently coached testimony, the court found the prayers,
which "frequently ma[de] reference to Jesus Christ, and often clos[ed] with the
phrase 'in Jesus' name we pray,'" id. at 711, did not have a secular purpose, see ager,
862 F.2d at 829-30.
In the context of school board meetings, the presumed purpose of creating a sol-
emn atmosphere sometimes appears almost comical. See, e.g., Nancy Eshelman, Send
Circus Away from E-Town, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Oct. 17, 1996, at BI (reporting contro-
versy and "circus" atmosphere surrounding passage of "pro-family resolution" by the
school board, which opened its next meeting with a prayer "'in the name ofJesus'");
Wendling, supra note 2 (reporting the board president's response to fellow board
members who protested sectarian prayer: "'this is the way it's going to be, so get used
to it'").
'224 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-90 & n.1 1 (1983) (noting that legisla-
tive or congressional prayers are "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country").
V-5 As noted earlier, it is difficult to determine precisely the prevalence of invoca-
tions at public school board meetings, see supra note 16, and a thorough survey of the
practice is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, newspaper accounts of the
controversy surrounding the practice appear to confirm that the practice is neither
historically longstanding nor extremely widespread. See sources cited supra note 16.
On the other hand, opening a substantial number, if not a majority, of public school
board meetings with prayer on a regular (usually monthly or biweekly) basis cannot be
dismissed as a trivial matter. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992) (noting that
the prayers at issue occurred only once a year for no more than two minutes, but that
"the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or so of time consumed for prayers like
these").
226 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 16 (reporting school board members "voted against
the change [away from prayer] because the board acts as a model for district stu-
dents"); Dana Tofig, Enfield Board Considers Starting with a Prayer, HARTFORD COURANT,
Jan. 30, 1997, at BI (noting a school board member's assertion that opening school
board meetings with prayer "might send a good message to students and parents").
2-7 Cf Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (asserting the purpose of legislative prayer as
"invok[ing] Divine guidance on a public body");Jager, 862 F.2d at 830 ("[T]he School
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matur of government support on a majority's religious beliefs,2 8 the
overriding purpose is clearly religious. These purposes can be summed
up in the words of the Reverend Christopher L. Rose, who suggested
that the intent of government prayer is "'to recognize the authority of
God over every aspect of our work, but might... also be the self-
sanctification of those who endure those often empty phrases.'" '  If
the former is the case, a secular purpose is difficult to divine; if the lat-
ter, one must wonder whether the requirement of a secular purpose is
met when government officials use religious means to achieve "self-
sanctification." Finally, although the Court has not required that gov-
ernment action be narrowly tailored to meet its asserted secular pur-
pose, it is difficult to discern a secular purpose in using a religious invo-
cation rather than any opening statement intended to solemnize a
public school event2 0
Arguing that a petition to a supreme being at an official govern-
ment meeting has a secular purpose is somewhat like arguing that the
purpose of attending a sporting event is to improve the economy. In
both cases, one chooses the action for obvious reasons (to engage pub-
licly in religious activity or to be entertained), but rationalizes the ac-
tion by asserting as its purpose an incidental and even questionable
consequence of the action (e.g., solemnizing a government event or
improving the economy). This faulty logic not only ignores the duty of
the courts to distinguish "a sham secular purpose from a sincere one,"23'
but also effectively prejudges the next step in the Lemon analysis by rais-
ing the tangential (and dubious) result of a religiously motivated activ-
District wanted to have invocations that publicly express support for Protestant Chris-
tianity.").
See, e.g., Ernesto Portillo Jr., Trustees Put Prayer on Agenda in Vrista, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., Feb. 18, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7472692 (noting one trustee's asser-
tion that "prayer and invoking 'God' is a recognition of 'a higher force that brings eve-
ryone together' and ... acknowledges the 'commonality'" of the school district's resi-
dents).
: Pollack, supra note 188, at 173.
Cf NATIONAL SCH. PUB. RELATIONS Ass'N, supra note 22, at 42 (suggesting that
school boards "have musical numbers and other student presentations at the opening
of the meeting[, as it] never takes more than 5 or 10 minutes and can go a long way
toward setting a positive mood for all that is to follow"). In this vein, it is worth noting
that in many instances the introduction of an opening prayer at school board meet-
ings has followed the election to the school board of community members affiliated
with religious organizations. See, e.g., Greg Tasker, A Change in Direction, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 30, 1995, at IC (describing the change in Garrett County school board prac-
tices after the election of Christian conservatives to the board).
231 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
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ity to the status of "primary effect."
2. Effect Prong
The second prong in the Lemon analysis, like the first, often re-
quires separating bald assertions of secularity from the real effects of
government religious activity. In this case, however, the test is pre-
sumably tougher. Because the primary effect of a government activity
must not be to "advance or inhibit religion," incidental effects, such as
solemnizing an occasion, cannot save a government activity whose over-
232riding effect is to advance religion. The problem here is that the
primary effect of government conduct in this area is often "in the eye of
the beholder." Somewhat ironically (or perhaps not), those who sup-
port government religious activities often view the primary effect in
purely secular terms, while those who oppose such activities see religion
inevitably (and unconstitutionally) advanced every time the powerful
and authoritative voice of government speaks in a religious tenor."
While some have criticized challenges to govemment-sponsored
prayer as being based on nothing more than abstract and unmeasur-
able harm to the listener, * the "primary effect" alleged by prayer sup-
porters is usually just as abstract and unmeasurable.235 However, in the
2.2 Although an argument can be made that government-sponsored prayer
"inhibits" religion by usurping a primary role of religious institutions (i.e., seeking the
guidance or assistance of a supreme being in the daily affairs of men and women), I
will concentrate on the tendency of government religious activity to "advance" relig-
ion.
233 Different members of the Court have also expressed conflicting views of the
effect of government religious activity. Justice Harlan, for example, viewed the effect
of religious conduct as "the State ... utilizing the prestige, power, and influence of a
public institution to bring religion into the lives of citizens." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) (internal quota-
tion omitted). In Justice Scalia's opinion, the primary effect of a government-
sponsored prayer, offered by a sectarian religious leader, is to "inoculat[e persons of
other faiths] from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be repli-
cated" and "to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an
affection-for one another." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling as "ludicrous"
and "beyond the absurd" the notion that students were coerced into participating in
their graduation invocation and benediction).
See, e.g., id. at 646 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (listing as benefits of prayer the foster-
ing of toleration and affection). In addition, many government-prayer supporters as-
sert that the absence of prayer has a detrimental effect on prayer supporters that is at
least as abstract and "psychological" as any harm asserted by prayer opponents. See,
e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 RI.A. ST. U. L. REV. 1183,
1197 (1994) (arguing that "[w]hen the state uses secular language to convey ideas,
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context of public school board meetings, it is difficult to discern a pri-
mary effect other than the advancement of religion. Given public
school boards' narrow scope of authority and important representative
role within local communities, their explicitly religious conduct, visible
to so many in the community and so clearly outside of their normal
pedagogical or fiscal roles,2r is very likely to have the effect of advanc-
ing religion-and often a particular religion. In addition, given the
role of public schools in the transmission of values to children, it is in-
evitable that pupils will get the message that religion is favored when
their school board members officially declare, through prayer, their
support for religion at the beginning of regular board meetings. 2 7 Al-
though some prayer supporters may occasionally admit that this is the
hoped-for effect of meeting prayers,2 it is an effect that the First
Amendment leaves to religious, and not government, institutions.
3. Entanglement Prong
Public school boards are in many cases the governmental bodies
240most responsive to local communities. Meetings of these boards are
intended to be participatory affairs where important decisions regard-. 241
ing children and taxes are made. Given this reality, the very notion of
injecting a religious activity into this democratic, pluralistic mix is prob-
lematic. Of greater concern, however, is the entanglement which inevi-
values, or perceptions of reality that are plainly at odds with deeply held religious be-
liefs, the effect on impressionable children can be significant").
2 Cf Sonia Nazario, Schools Defend Decision Against Offering Breakfast LA. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, at A38 (reporting that the school district declined to participate in a
school breakfast program because "'[s]chools need to educate,'" yet "the school board
begins its meetings with Christian prayer").
23 See, e.g., John Przybys, School Prayer, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 7, 1995, at 1C
(reporting a former school board member's observation that "'[i] t seems to me if it's
deemed proper to open up the school board trustees meetings with prayer, that at
least implies a belief that we believe prayer is important as it relates to education. Why
shouldn't it be in schools?'"); see also sources cited supra notes 110-11.
2M See supra note 110.
29 More than two centuries ago,James Madison made the point that advancement
of religion should be left (and was accomplished most successfully when left) to relig-
ious institutions. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RE-
LIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 1 6 (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 298, 301
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973); cf. Mike Padgett, Status of School Prayer in Limbo,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 21, 1995, at 8 (reporting the school board president's statement
that "'[w]e have a deal with churches-they don't teach algebra and we don't organize
prayer'").
2. See supra Part I.B.1.
241 See supra Part I.B.2.
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tably arises when such injection of religion is carried out in practice.
Disputes arise over the general appropriateness of commingling relig-
ion and public education, perhaps one of the most volatile subjects in
242many communities. More specifically, prayers may be explicitly sec-
tarian, creating even greater divisiveness within communities,24 or-
assuming only "nonsectarian" prayers may be used-elected officials
and judges will find themselves in the business of vetting prayers, a
practice the Court has consistently rejected, from Engel to Lee (and even
in Marsh) .244 Although the entanglement prong is perhaps the most
245criticized of the Lemon test's prongs, the Court's consistent rejection
of any blending of religious activity and public schools supports the
proposition that, in the context under consideration in this Comment,
242 See, e.g., Ernesto Portillo Jr., School Trustees in Vista Pray, Then Set Policy on Invoca-
tions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 12, 1993, at B2 (noting that a three-to-two vote to
introduce prayer at board meetings "unleash (ed] a storm of controversy over the role
of prayer in the public arena and during school-related functions");Jeff Webb, Moment
of Silence May Be Only Fair Option to Prayer, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 2
(anticipating an "emotionally charged and potentially divisive" dispute over prayer at
board meetings, as well as some residents' insistence that board prayers be explicitly
Christian); see also Strossen, supra note 156, at 610-15 (noting extreme volatility of
school prayer issue). In many instances disputes erupt even among the (relatively few)
members of the school board itself. See, e.g., Wendling, supra note 2, at 4B (reporting
on a lawsuit by two school board members against the board president to enjoin his
continued use of prayer to open meetings).
243 See, e.g., Ernesto Portillo, Vista's Prayer Policy Is in Need of Guidance, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 3, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7475024 (noting a disagreement be-
tween a Buddhist priest and a Christian minister over the use of "God" in any school
board prayer, with the latter arguing that "a generic prayer would not be appropri-
ate"); Patricia White, Board Says, "Let Us Pray", ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at
1 (reporting that a board member "expressed concern ... that the traditional invoca-
tion might be offensive to non-Christians because of frequent references to Jesus
Christ," and that this "created an outcry in the community. Some argued that Chris-
tian traditions founded this country and should remain at the root of prayers at public
meetings."). In Engel, the Court noted that avoiding the political divisiveness which
often accompanied government expression of particular religious beliefs was one of
the specific aims of the Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30
(1962).
244 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-88 (1992) (noting problems when a
school chose the clergyman and controlled the content of the prayers given at gradua-
tion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (stating that "it is not for [the
Court] to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a particular
prayer"); Enge4 370 U.S. at 425 (stating that "it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers"); cf Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444,
1450 (D. Utah 1995) (scrutinizing plaintiff's proposed "prayer" for opening city gov-
ernment meetings and rejecting it because the prayer was "not rooted in religion").
24, See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (5-4
decision) (discussing problems with the entanglement prong and citing prior concur-
ring and dissenting opinions criticizing this prong of Lemon).
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an entanglement is both inevitable and unconstitutional.
B. The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor has argued for greater flexibility in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence than strict adherence to the Lemon test might al-
low. Her formulation, usually dubbed the "endorsement test," is very
similar to the Lemon test and therefore will not be discussed at length.
The endorsement test collapses Lemon into a single overriding analysis,
which asks whether a government action has the effect, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally, of "communicating a message of govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion.2 46 Put another way, gov-
ernment action must not send "a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community."247 A key question in applying the test
is who gets to determine the meaning of a government message.
Should a court analyze whether prayers at school board meetings
communicate a message of government endorsement of religion from
the perspective of a long-time community member who adheres to the
same faith as the members of the board? Or should it analyze the prob-
lem from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the community who happens
to belong to a minority faith-or is nonreligious? In a recent case,
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,248 Justice O'Connor
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) disagreed with Justice Stevens on
the application of the test to a private religious display on government
property.249 Their dispute revolved around whether an observer would
perceive the message as being endorsed by government, not around what
246 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the endorsement test
"preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that re-
ligion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred").
24 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). Pinette involved a challenge to a local government's de-
nial of an application from the Ku Klux Klan to erect a cross in a public square. See id
at 2444-45.
249 Compare id. at 2452 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (using the test of "reasonable,
informed observer"), with id. at 2466 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using the test of
"the universe of reasonable" observers, including one "who may not share the particu-
lar religious belief" expressed by the symbol or conduct at issue). Taking sides in this
dispute is not the point of the present Comment-nor do I believe it necessary in or-
der to analyze the issue under consideration. For further discussion of the
.reasonable observer" aspect of the endorsement test, see Developments in the Law, supra
note 158, at 1648-50.
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the observer would perceive as the message itself. Justice O'Connor did
not rule out an endorsement violation where the message was not the
government's, but she did not believe a "reasonable, informed ob-
server" in this particular case would perceive the message as that of the
government.
Turning to the situation of school board prayer, much of the dis-
cussion above regarding the Lemon test is applicable here. There would
appear to be little doubt that a prayer given at the beginning of an offi-
cial school board meeting is perceived as a message of the government.
For one thing, the message is that of the government unless the prayer
is made by a private person as part of an open public forum.2 For an-
other, unlike the situation in Pinette,252 with school board prayer, gov-
ernment officials are actively engaging in religious activity, either di-
rectly through the giving of prayers, or indirectly by affirmatively
arranging for other community members or district employees to give
an invocation. s The only question to be answered would be whether
the message thus conveyed is one of endorsement of either religion in
general or a particular religion. In the case of sectarian prayers, which
the school board invocations often are,25 the answer would seem obvi-
ous. Even where less than explicitly sectarian prayers are given, it would
be difficult to discern a message other than support for religion. The
message of the prayer would appear unmistakable, even to the
"reasonable, informed observer": the school board approves of the
practice and has officially endorsed its inclusion in the board's proceed-
ings despite the incongruity of a government entity authorized solely to
raise funds and educate children engaging in religious practices.
M~p SeePinett4 115 S. Ct. at 2454 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (stating that a violation
may exist if a religious group's message dominates a public forum).
231 For a discussion of the questionable proposition that an invocation at a school
board meeting would fall under the public forum doctrine, see infra Part III.D.2. Even
in the unlikely event that the prayer was considered private speech within a public fo-
rum, Justice O'Connor (and Justices Souter and Breyer, who joined her opinion)
would not rule out an endorsement test violation. See Pinette, 115 S. CL at 2454
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("At some point, for example, a private religious group
may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed
into a demonstration of approval.").
252 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
Seesources cited supra note 16.
See sources cited infra notes 282-83. Leaving aside for the moment the message
of any prayer to "nonbelievers," in the many cases where the school board prayer is
explicitly sectarian, there would seem to be little doubt that the invocations are send-
ing "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the politi-
cal community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
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Although two years earlier she had joined the Court's opinion in
Marsh, Justice O'Connor noted in Wallace that a "moment of silence law
that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, medita-
tion, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one
alternative over the others, should pass" the endorsement test.ss This
would seem to eliminate any prayers at school board meetings, while
permitting "moments of silence" which solemnized board meetings and
allowed community members and elected officials to "pray, meditate, or
reflect" as they chose. Finally, the case of school board prayer "is not a
case like Marsh v. Chambers in which government officials invoke spiri-
tual inspiration entirely for their own benefit without directing any re-
ligious message at the citizens they lead. " ss Unless the prayer is done
prior to the meeting, outside the observation of the public, school
boards are clearly "directing [a] religious message at the citizens they
lead" and that religious message violates the endorsement test.
C. The Coercion Test
Although Justice Kennedy advocated a fairly narrow coercion-based
analysis in one of his first Establishment Clause cases, 7 more recently
he split with the Court's other coercion proponents in Lee v. Weisman
Although a detailed analysis of the coercion test is beyond the scope of
this Comment,29 for present purposes, it should be noted that the pri-
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor also noted in Wallace that the reasonable
observer in the analysis should be one "acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation" of a challenged statute. Id. Although school board prayers are
often implemented outside of the official policymaking process, the act itself of open-
ing school board meetings with prayer is an official act which can be analyzed from the
perspective of the reasonable observer. Cf. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986) (noting that municipal liability for civil rights violations "may be im-
posed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circum-
stances").
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (SouterJ., concurring) (citation
omitted).
2 Justice Kennedy interpreted Court precedents, up to 1989, as requiring only
that the state not "give direct benefits to religion" to the extent that it establishes (or
tends to establish) an official religion and that government "not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise." County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). He rejected analysis of the en-
dorsement test through the eyes of "nonadherents," id. at 670, expressing confidence
that "communities [would) make reasonable judgments respecting the accommoda-
tion or acknowledgment" of different religious expressions, id. at 679.
= 505 U.S. 577 (1992). For a full discussion of Le see supra Part IA.3.
For a thorough discussion of the coercion test, see Steven G. Gey, Religious Coer-
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mary disagreement among the coercion proponents in Lee was over the
definition of coercion. 260 The majority held that attendance at one's
(nonmandatory) graduation ceremony was "in a fair and real sense
obligatory" because of the emotional and psychological pressures to at-
tend.26' Therefore, it was as if the government had "coerced" a gradu-
ate to participate in whatever activities took place at the ceremony since
attendance was not truly voluntary. In addition, the graduate was co-
erced to participate in the specific religious activities at the graduation
262from public and peer pressure to conform.
The dissent found this analysis "incoherent," "ludicrous" and
don and the Establishment Clauste 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 463, 482-526 (discussing problems
with the coercion analysis and asking "whether any meaningful limits would remain on
government activity advancing the majority's religious values" under the coercion
test). It should be emphasized that, despite the discussion in the text of the coercion
analysis, earlier Supreme Court cases explicitly stated that a constitutional violation
under the Establishment Clause did not depend on a showing of coercion, whether
defined broadly or narrowly. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
One problem with the narrow coercion test that is particularly relevant to school
board prayer does deserve mention. In Lee, the dissent dismisses the majority's asser-
tion that a silent protester has been coerced to "participate" in prayer as "nothing
short of ludicrous." Lee, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the dissent
ridicules the notion that sitting (or even standing with those who wish to pray) some-
how equals participation, its analysis demonstrates a complete failure to acknowledge
the unique nature of prayer. Citing Barnette, the dissent notes that "[t]he government
can, of course, no more coerce political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy." Id. at
638. However, sitting quietly while others recite the pledge of allegiance or enduring
the barbs of a government speaker advocating political views antithetical to those of
the listener have a fundamentally different effect than sitting, standing, or in any way
being present as a prayer is recited. "Prayer is not a statement about something, it is a
petition directed to someone.... To pray is not only to acknowledge a belief.., it is
to practice a belief and to enter into it." Hall, supra note 6, at 59 (emphasis added).
This difference is one of the reasons that "the Establishment Clause is a specific pro-
hibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart
in the speech provisions." Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
What is more, when a prayer is recited at a government function, by either a gov-
ernment official or one explicitly authorized to pray by a government official, a person
exercising her legal right (and often community obligation) to be present at that gov-
ernment event is subjected to far more than "the minimal inconvenience of standing
or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation." Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf.
Hall, supra note 6, at 89 ("A state has no reason to force citizens with deeply held relig-
ious beliefs to witness in respectful silence religious rites they deem heretical. Gov-
ernment has no reason to ask that different religious faiths appreciate one another or
that they participate together injoint religious exercises.").
260 I will refer to the Lee majority's view as the "broad coercion" test and to the
analysis employed by the Lee dissent as the "narrow coercion" test.
-61 Le 505 U.S. at 586.
262 See id. at 593-94 (citing psychological studies as evidence that "adolescents are
often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity").
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"beyond the absurd."63 In short, the dissenting Justices argued that a
constitutional violation existed only where there was "coercion of relig-
ious orthodoxy... by force of law and threat of penaly,"264 or when gov-
ernment religious activity was explicitly sectarian, in that it endorsed
particular details regarding "a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the -world... (for example, the divinity of Christ) .265
Under either of these versions of the coercion test, analysis of the
practice of public school board prayer centers on two questions: what
coercion is present and what is the nature of the prayer. Under the Lee
majority's analysis, "subtle coercive pressures" to support or participate
in the school board prayer would suffice to create a constitutional viola-
tion.266 This analysis is similar to ideas expressed by concurringJustices
in Engel2" and Schempp.2 ' The unifying theme in each of these concep-tions of coercion is a rejection of any government-imposed tradeoff.2 9
260 Id. at 636-38 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 640.
2 6 Id. at 641. The latter part of the dissent's test, the requirement that govern-
ment not endorse (even without coercion) explicitly sectarian religious messages, still
appears to leave room for many government-sponsored prayers. The definition of sec-
tarian, or "specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the di-
vinity of Christ)," id. (Scalia, J., dissenting), would seem to allow prayers as explicitly
sectarian as the Lord's Prayer, as long as they did not mention "the divinity of Christ."
But cf. sources cited infra notes 280 and 284. This would allow for "nonsectarian"
prayers which invoke God (or perhaps even Jesus, as long as his "divinity" is not men-
tioned) to the exclusion of nonbelievers and nontheists.
In addition, the dissent put forth an argument that the prayers in question in Lee
were an "expression of gratitude to God that a majority of the community wishes to
make," rather than an official government expression of sectarian religious beliefs.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia,J., dissenting). One critic interpreted this argument as an
assertion that "true religious liberty can exist only if the government has the authority
to keep pesky individual dissenters from interfering with the community's collective
religious observances." Gey, supra note 259, at 524. The issue of whether government-
sponsored prayers can be interpreted as private "community" speech as opposed to
public "government" speech is briefly discussed infra Part III.D.2.
266 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
267 Justice Douglas noted that "[flew adults, let alone children, would leave our
courtroom or the Senate or the House while those prayers are being given. Every such
audience is in a sense a 'captive' audience." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442 (1962)
(Dou las,J., concurring).
" Justice Brennan declared that "the State could not constitutionally require a
student to profess publicly his disbelief as the prerequisite to the exercise of his consti-
tutional right of abstention." School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 289 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring).
269 As Justice Kennedy said in Lee, rejecting the notion that the religious objector
must bend to the will of the majority, "[ilt is a tenet of the First Amendment that the
State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the
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As with children wishing to attend their graduation, adults exercising
their legal right to participate in the deliberations of their local gov-
ernment should not be forced to choose between participation in the
activity or subjection to a religious exercise that offends their most fun-
damental belief system .2 Therefore, it appears likely that the broad
coercion test advanced by the majority in Lee would strike down the
practice of school board prayer.
Even under the Lee dissent's narrow coercion test, one can argue
that being forced to abstain from participation in the workings of gov-
ernment (either as an elected official-when a board member objects
to the religious practice-or as a community member) is a
"coercion... by force of law and threat of penalty."2 2 Given the Lee dis-
sent's view, however, that silence in the face of a petition to a supreme
being is simply "respectful nonparticipation," it is highly unlikely that
the proponents of the narrow coercion test would find coercion, rather
than an unwillingness to show "respect for the religious observances of
others," if a prayer objector felt compelled to leave the meeting of a
government body engaged in prayer.27 The nature of the prayer would
seem the most likely method of striking down a school board prayer
under the Lee dissent's narrow coercion test. This ensures that the prac-
tice of school board invocations would never be found facially unconsti-
tutional, but rather individual occurrences of invocations which crossed
the line into the explicitly "sectarian" might be successfully challenged,
price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice." Lee, 505 U.S. at
596.
270 The Court has held that when a State gives its citizens the right to vote, it will
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny in attempting to justify the classification and ex-
clusion of certain groups of citizens from that right of electoral participation, includ-
ing in the school district context. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 626 (1969).
271 Justice Blackmun's comments in Lee apply to this analysis of the "coercion" in-
volved when one must choose between maintaining involvement in the affairs of one's
local schools and refraining from participation in religious exercises to which one ob-
jects:
Democracy requires the nourishment of dialog and dissent, while religious
faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human delibera-
tion. When the government appropriates religious truth, it "transforms ra-
tional debate into theological decree." Those who disagree no longer are
questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of a higher
authority who is beyond reproach.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 607 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 640 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (emphasis removed).
273 Id. at 638, 646. But see supra note 259 (criticizing the Lee dissent's conception of
public prayer).
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if the prayers were sufficiently sectarian and if they were sufficiently
connected to the official government body. 4
D. Alternative Arguments for School Board Prayer
There are two final arguments put forth by proponents of govern-
ment-sponsored prayer, which have features similar to the narrow coer-
cion analysis. I will discuss each briefly below.
1. Civic Prayer
Supporters of civic prayer assert similar arguments to those of the
dissent in Le. 2 5  Civic prayer proponents insist on the right of
"citizens... to state their dependence on God in a way as to make it a
simple and common prayer for all."276 As applied to school board
prayer (or other government prayer), the civic prayer argument suffers
from at least three fundamental flaws.
First, although the nonpreferentialist argument has been unequiv-
ocally rejected by the Court,27 the civic prayer argument presumes, as
does the narrow coercion analysis, that it is permissible for government
to endorse and participate in a religious activity that excludes nonbe-
lievers. Prayer is, by definition, religious, and whether it is called "civic"
or "secular" is irrelevant to this reality.2 8  Unless decades of Court
precedents are overturned and the favoring of religion in general is al-
lowed, even a generic religious exercise is not permissible.
Second, what is often called "civic prayer" is almost inevitably sectar-
ian. Given the wide diversity of religions (and nonbelievers) in the
United States and the difficulty of finding (or writing) a prayer that
addresses all beliefs, 280 a truly "nonsectarian" prayer is almost impossible
274 See supra note 265 and infra Part II.D.2.
2r. See discussion supra note 259; see, e.g., Wallace, supra note 235, at 1264 & n.380
(suggesting that "[merely listening to a prayer at an otherwise secular event carries no
inherent religious significance" and should not comprise, even when taking place be-
fore a captive audience, a constitutional violation).
276 DONOVAN ETAL., supra note 149, at 81.
2n See, eg., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17
(1963).
278 See supra note 259; see also 117 CONG. REc. 39,898 (1971) (statement of Rep.
Drinan) ("The very concept of prayer seems inevitably to include a theistic element. It
is precisely because of this element that any prayer must be deemed to reflect the the-
ology of a particular group and is consequently denominational or sectarian."), quoted
in ALLEY, supra note 135, at 174.
279 See supra note 166.
280 See ALLEY, supra note 135, at 137 ("Jews do not have a Christian heritage, while
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to achieve.
Finally, it does not take much of a slippery slope for "civic prayer"
to descend into explicitly sectarian prayer, given the inclinations of any
majority to ratify its own beliefh and the evidence of serious ignorance
by many elected officials regarding what exactly constitutes a sectarian
282prayer. Perhaps the best example of this latter problem is the fact
that so many school boards that have invocations begin their meetings
with the Lord's Prayer.28 When confronted by objectors, many of these
officials entirely fail to understand how explicitly sectarian is this
284prayer.
2. Free Speech
The final argument, discussed only briefly because of its general
implausibility in the specific context of public school board meetings, is
the free speech argument.285 In order for a community resident (or
Christians most certainly do have ajewish heritage. Therefore, Jewish citizens do not,
in point of fact, have aJudeo-Christian tradition."); NORD, supra note 112, at 260-61
("All prayers are formulated in the language and symbols of some religion rather than
others.... There is no such thing as nonsectarian religion; to pray is to take sides
among religions."); Loconte, supra note 158, at 27-30 (noting that arguments for a
common prayer are based on a "religious consensus" that "no longer exists").
28 See, e.g., Fleet, supra note 178, at 561 (noting James Madison's objection that
religious proclamations tend to narrow "to the standard of the predominant sect").
See, e.g., Patricia White, The Children Shall Lead Them to Pray, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at 1 (discussing a local school board's debate about whether to
include the name "Jesus Christ" in board prayers).
2 See, e.g., Lori Badders, Board Boots Resident, YORK DAILY REC., Nov. 20, 1992, at
IC (describing how the audience at a school board meeting bowed their heads to re-
cite the Lord's Prayer); Debbie Wygent, Octorara Board to Consider New Guidelines for
Public Meetings, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Jan. 19, 1994, at B4 (noting that a local school
board intended to retain the practice of reciting the Lord's Prayer).
284 See, e.g., NICHOLAS AYO, THE LORD'S PRAYER: A SURVEY THEOLOGICAL AND
LITERARY 1, 6 (1992) (noting the centrality of the Lord's Prayer "to our daily Christian
life" and that the "prayer is Jesus Christ as a living prayer, and the Christian in imita-
tion of him"); see also PFEFFER, supra note 131, at 461 ("The courts that had held the
Bible to be nonsectarian had no difficulty in so holding the Lord's Prayer.").
285 This argument is still being played out in the context of graduation ceremonies
in the wake of Lee. Some circuit courts have accepted the argument that a school
board's delegation of the authority to pray (or to determine whether or not to pray) to
nongovernment parties such as students, can constitutionalize the practice. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1992). Other cir-
cuit courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd.
of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). In prior cases, the Court
appeared to reject unequivocally the argument that a school district could avoid Estab-
lishment Clause problems by "delegating" its authority to private parties. In Schempp,
the Court said:
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elected official) to assert a free speech right to group prayer at an offi-
cial public school board meeting, the location where the prayer is of-
fered must be a "public forum."286 It is highly unlikely that an entire
board meeting is a full-fledged "public forum," open to public com-
ment at any time. 8 At most, certain periods of the meeting may be des-
ignated a limited public forum, for the particular purposes deemed
relevant by the school board. If, for example, a period is provided dur-
ing the meeting for "public comments," 8 presumably any member of
the public can get up and "pray" for the board members or the district's
students-if these are subjects within the range of "public comments"
and if the speaker adheres to any reasonable restrictions that the board
has placed on comments, such as time limits.
Three problems arise in trying to fit typical school board prayers
into this limited public forum analysis. First, prayers almost always take
[W]e cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a
State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of
those affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of relig-
ion.... [T]he Free Exercise Clause ... has never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
286 A full-length discussion of the Court's public forum doctrine is not necessary or
possible here. The general rule, as outlined in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), usually places government property in one of three
categories: 1) a public forum, in which any government restrictions on speech must
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest; 2) a nonpublic forum, in
which government restrictions on speech must only be reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory; and 3) a limited (or designated) public forum, which is created when the gov-
ernment chooses to open a nonpublic forum for particular types of speech. The gov-
ernment may restrict the limited public forum to certain subjects, but is otherwise
constrained in its regulation of a limited public forum by the same rules that apply to a
public forum. See id. at 45-46. It is the last category under which a portion of a gov-
ernment meeting would fall (that is, the government body has designated a part of its
meeting as a limited public forum for any and all comments on particular subjects).
27 Although school board meetings are often governed in part by state laws de-
termining which portions must be open to the public and the extent to which the
board must receive public comments, the meeting itself is not a constitutionally re-
quired public forum. "The Constitution does not grant to members of the public
generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy." Minnesota
State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984); see also City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 175 n.8 (1976) ("Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified
subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business.").
288 See, e.g., Wygent, supra note 283 (noting that a school board, which opened its
meeting with the Lord's Prayer, established a policy providing for public comment pe-
riods and clarifying that "meetings are not a public forum for debate or argument and
that the board must be able to conduct its business in an orderly and reflective man-
ner").
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place at the opening moments of the meeting, during a time that is very
much off-limits to members of the public.29 They do not regularly oc-
cur during a "public comments" period.2 Second, it is questionable
whether most boards have the authority under their respective state
laws to discuss, or to open their meetings for discussion of, religious
matters, as opposed to issues related to the district's financial condition
or the education of pupils.' Finally, and most fundamentally, even if a
school board actually has the power to deem a part of its meeting a
"public forum" open for religious messages, any prayer must be allowed
regardless of its content 2--as long as it meets the noncontent-basedcriteria applicable to the forum.9 3
289 Government bodies invariably refuse requests for "equal time" during opening
prayers. See, e.g., Badders, supra note 283 (describing how a man was cited by police
for disorderly conduct after he interrupted the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at a
school board meeting); Santee to Consider $150 Claim over Prayer Issue, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 28, 1988, at B3 (reporting that a member of the public filed a claim
against the city for not allowing him to address the city council on the issue of its invo-
cation).
2W See sources cited supra note 16 (reporting method of giving prayer in various
school districts).
-ji See supra Part I.B.2.
M See City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 176 (holding that, where a public body opens its
meetings to speakers on certain subjects, no speaker wishing to address that subject
may be excluded on the basis of the content of his or her speech); see also Rosenberger
v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1995) (noting that the government
may not exclude speech from an open forum it has created based on discriminatory
criteria or distinctions "not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum'"
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985))). In short, even if the school board could create a forum for religious mes-
sages, but see infra note 293, it could not exclude any religious messages from that fo-
rum based on the particular religious viewpoint of the message. Once a local minister
is permitted to give the Lord's Prayer, the board must allow a Jewish prayer, Buddhist
and Muslim religious messages, perhaps a Satanist chant, and any other "religious"
messages offered during the designated time.
For a discussion of the obvious problems this requirement will create, as board
members attempt to discern which messages are appropriate for the religious forum
they have opened, see supra Part III.A.3. This discussion also assumes, for the sake of
analyzing the free speech argument, that it would be constitutionally permissible (as
well as within its statutory authority) for a school board to create a limited public fo-
rum open only to religious messages. But ef. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275
(1981) (holding that a university could not exclude religious groups from its open fo-
rum for student groups, but implying that "empirical evidence that religious groups
will dominate [the] open forum" might create an Establishment Clause concern). Jus-
tice Souter made a related point in his Lee concurrence, noting that "[i] f the State had
chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of
those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious mes-
sage, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State."
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis
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CONCLUSION
"Counting votes" on the Supreme Court can be unseemly-and
one engages in the practice at one's peril.24 Nevertheless, under the
traditional "neutrality" principles of Lemon, to which Justice Stevens still
adheres,2" under the endorsement test that Justices O'Connor, Souter
and Breyer used in Pinette, and probably even under the broad coercion
analysis thatJustice Kennedy adopted in Lee, school board prayer would
appear unconstitutional. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's
holdings regarding graduation prayer and every other intrusion of re-
ligious activity into the public-school context. On the other hand, the
narrow coercion analysis of Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist would almost certainly sanction any school board invoca-
tion, with the possible exception of one uttered officially by a board
member and invoking the "divinity of Christ."
Were the Court to come to the conclusion that prayer at a public
school board meeting is unconstitutional, it would be adhering to a
half-century of consistentjurisprudence in the area of religion and pub-
lic schools. It could reach this conclusion without overruling the nar-
row holding of Marsh and without revisiting that case's questionable
reasoning. By doing so, the Court would go far toward maintaining both
the modem, pluralistic public schools on which our nation depends
and our religious institutions that will continue to thrive with educated
and uncoerced adherents. Finally, such a decision would ensure that,
"in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."2
added); cf. Board of Educ. of KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698
(1994) ("[A] State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to
a religious criterion.").
2 See, e.g., Serra, supra note 8, at 797-98 (predicting, prior to Lee v. Weisman, that
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy would help form a majority for approving graduation
prayer).
M-justice Ginsburg's short dissent in Pinette appears to indicate adherence to the
traditional neutrality principles of Lemon. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2475 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Everson and sug-
gesting that "the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple govern-
ment from church").
Z6 MADISON, supra note 239, 1 1, at 299 (emphasis added).
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